


Olympics Security Lessons: From Munich to Sochi



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Contributors:

Yonah Alexander

Kim Phan

Thomas M. Hastings

Dr. Ariel Cohen

Peter Roudik

Professor Ellen M. Zavian

Professor Bradley S. Shear

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Please contact the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 901 North Stuart Street
Suite 200 Arlington, VA 22203

Tel. 703-562-4513, 703-525-0770 ext. 237 Fax 703-525-0299
yalexander@potomac institute.org www.potomac institute.org
www.terrorism electronic journal.org www.iucts.org

Kim Phan

Executive Director, International Law Institute

Welcome to the International Law Institute. We are proud to co-host this talk on “Security at the Olympics: from Munich to Sochi” with Dr. Yonah Alexander and the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies. Established in 1955, the International Law Institute is an independent, non-profit training and technical institute that helps developing countries in the mission “Foster Prosperity through the Rule of Law”, helping countries achieve economic growth by having a good legal infrastructure. ILI has assisted countries in drafting their laws, and has trained more than 28,000 government officials and practitioners from more than 185 countries, on all matters from governance, anticorruption, and how to participate in the global community. The partnership with the Inter-University Center for Terrorism is due to our belief that development, economic growth, and the rule of law has the best chance of success when there is security; and conversely, that security is made stronger when rule of law is in place. Development and Security needs to go hand in hand.

This talk on “Security and the Olympics” is very timely. We would all like to think that the Olympics is about Sports and International Competition, but this Olympic has been weighed by security concerns. And is a reminder that geo-political politics, and terrorism does not put itself on hold just because the Olympic Flame is burning, and that while Sports is for two weeks, put on the world stage, so too does it make it exponentially more attractive for extreme and terrorist groups to try to get their agenda on the world stage.

With that, I would like to welcome the distinguished speakers, C-Span, and the audience to the International Law Institute.

Thomas M. Hastings

Former official at the Office of Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State and at the FBI's Foreign and Domestic Emergency Support Team programs; Coordinated USG support at the Sydney and Athens Olympic Games

Good afternoon, it's a pleasure to be here today. This is a fortuitous opportunity for me: I just recently retired from federal government service after 36 years with the Marine Corps, State Department, and the FBI and was contacted by my old colleague Mike Kraft and Professor Alexander about the opportunity to come and speak to you a little bit today about some of my experiences. If you had asked me thirty years ago if I'd ever be here or doing any of these kinds of things, I certainly would have never thought so. So for you students in the room just let your mind wander where you may be thirty years from now, you'll be amazed.

Eleven years into my Marine Corp career General Gray, who I think some of you know, a former Commandant of the Marine Corps, basically answering a request for help from the Ambassador at Large for Counterterrorism, Ambassador Jerry Bremer, directed that I get up to Washington to work on counterterrorism. Frankly that was the first I had heard about it or ever thought about it, and that was in 1989. I spent two and a half years as a Marine officer there detailed to State and it was certainly an eye opening experience. But in those days, if you remember the Ollie North experience, I was advised not to stay too long in Washington. So two and a half years later I went to Newport (The Naval War College) and I got some more education and then came back to Quantico to teach, but was called back by State two years after I left about a job opportunity. At the same time, back in 1993 when opportunities to reduce the size of the military were upon us I was able to retire early and take a position back at State Counterterrorism, so I started in a civilian capacity in 1993 and was there until 2006.

What I want to talk about, and I'll get into the FBI piece of it, but I just want to talk a little bit about my experiences working U.S. government coordination for overseas Olympic Games. I did have the opportunity, and they were both highlights of my time at State Department, to be involved in the preparation and the actual deployment of U.S. government support to two Olympic games, both the Sydney Games in 2000 and the Athens Games in 2004. As you know, seven years before the Olympics the venues and cities are identified so those countries have seven years to prepare in all aspects of preparation but of course lately security is a significant point of that.

The Sydney games were prior to 9/11 with a very close ally and were an exciting opportunity. We worried about worst case scenarios and that's what you do. It's really risk management when you are looking at the Olympics. The 1972 Munich Olympics was a watershed event and it's really when our government and really all governments in the world looked at their counterterrorism capabilities and realized they were not really where they should be. We looked at how the West Germans responded to what happened there and each government, and especially ours, looked at our own capabilities realized we had some work to do to make sure we had capabilities to respond if similar things happened to us. So really one can look at that as the beginning of government, military, and law enforcement analysis of where we needed to go to be able to respond to an event like that. So by 2000 we were pretty advanced. We had our own summer games in 1996 in Atlanta and I as working at State at the time, and you can imagine when you

host a games in your own country, much like the Russians are going through now, it's a very big deal. You want it to come off perfectly, you want it to be something that the whole world looks at and admires and actually wants to come back and maybe visit those venues later, and that happens a lot. So as we prepared for Sydney we expected nothing but a good opportunity, but also we saw some potential threats. But frankly when you are working with a country like Australia, who's a close ally with very advanced capabilities, the most that the U.S. government does is offer assistance. It's that government's show. It's their Olympic games, and the U.S. and other governments who have capabilities to provide assistance offer it, but it's something that is only offered and we attempt to provide whatever assistance we can.

We are concerned about our athletes frankly because we know that the U.S. is a target and much like Israel and our other allies we can always expect if there is a threat to athletes that it will be directed at some of those key countries that we know. So with that in mind we do have to work with the host government's security elements to make sure our athletes are provided for and that we have a liaison effort between our athletes and the host government's security apparatus and that function is provided by State Department's Diplomatic Security Service. So when we are actually overseas our athletes have a liaison from the diplomatic security who works with that particular team of athletes and coordinates closely with that host government's security apparatus and so that's something that diplomatic security has been doing as far back as we can remember. Now if you remember the Sydney games people were amazed how wonderfully they went, what a great an event it was in all aspects and certainly it was a highlight for me, everything went well there were no significant events, but we certainly prepared but, again, in an advisory way. The Australians had a very good handle on the security situation and everything went well.

But the next year we had 9/11 and that certainly changed the complexion of the preparation for Olympics after that. Now if you remember in 2002 we hosted the winter games in Salt Lake City and there was concern about that being so close to 9/11 but I've come to believe that winter games do not necessarily offer the same threats as summer games. For a number of reasons, I could joke about it but suffice to say we just haven't had those kinds of problems and we didn't in Salt Lake. But certainly as we were looking ahead to the Athens Olympics we were concerned because of the venue and because of post 9/11 concerns, so the efforts we made with the Greeks were very significant. We across the board offered training to the Greeks through the anti-terrorism assistance program that the State Department manages, law enforcement training was also offered from the FBI and the intelligence community, a significant presence was there and working in coordination with the Greeks and again it went very well. But the preparation was far more significant than we had seen previously and, frankly, if you recall the Greeks spent somewhere in the order of 1.2 billion dollars for security for the Athens games, and in preparation that was all looked upon as absolutely necessary but when these games are over and nothing happens and they go back and look at the 1.2 billion dollars spent there was a little bit of coming back at the U.S. and saying that perhaps we were overstating the terrorist threat at the games and in the press it was said that the U.S. was seeing a terrorist behind every lamppost and caused the security preparations and costs to skyrocket which affected the Greek bottom line, but that's the reality of these things.

When you are doing risk management it's kind of like purchasing insurance. I see the analogy where you could buy Lloyds of London or you could buy the generic brand and if its lives and

security at stake we normally want to, as we manage that risk, we want to do everything we think is prudent in terms of preparation. You know we can get into more detail in the question and answer period about any specific questions you may have, certainly we were very pleased that after Athens we did not have any events. We also were involved in the London games in 2012, but again it was similar to Australia, with the UK their capabilities are very advanced they needed very little support other than advisory and liaison assistance so normally the U.S. is going to provide advisory, law enforcement, security, and intelligence advice and assistance as requested but certainly we see that the host government is responsible for the security of the Olympics we just offer what we can do, providing that we have confidence that our athletes are in good hands and that we have liaison with those security forces involved with the security so that we feel comfortable that our athletes will be safe and secure and that is what most countries do.

Other countries that also have concerns about perhaps being targeted have a similar approach to security for their athletes and we've seen that all along. I'm pleased so far to see that in Sochi things have gone well, other than the weather which we can't control, sixty degrees on the slopes, but you can see what an important thing it is to have a safe and secure Olympic games and certainly we do and there has been some press that the U.S. has some folks out there but again certainly in no other capacity than advisory and liaison and assistance just working hand and hand with the host government working to provide whatever help that we can and to watch our athletes and to provide some protective liaison for our teams.

I really had a great opportunity as I moved on to the FBI in 2006 really because I met the boss of the FBI's Critical Incident Response Group during the Athens games and he made me an offer to come down and actually work some of these issues with the Bureau. I was in the Crisis Management Unit and, just recently as of October first of last year, there was a merger of the crisis management and special events management units within the FBI and they're all in the same unit now so we actually put our crisis management and special events management efforts together as we look at these games both domestically and internationally. And this is not just the Olympics we also look at other international events such as the World Cup coming up in Brazil, the Pan Am games are always important the year before the Olympics because we usually have about a thousand U.S. athletes at the Pan Am games and it's a preparation for Olympic work so those security issues that we have anywhere hold true in the Pan American games as well so it's not just the Olympics where we are taking a look at providing assistance, it's all international athletic events because frankly we know that terrorists, and I would agree they're not going away, as Professor Alexander mentions, we do have to consider the threat and possibilities and counter those as best we can through preparation and counter measures and that's the effort, that's what it is about, and it's certainly across the board but international athletic competitions are events that we especially want to be peaceful and without incident so we make extra efforts within our government to ensure that that's the case.

And I'll leave my remarks at that, and I thank you again for the opportunity to be here, it was a privilege. I just retired and I haven't been able to speak in a venue like this for a long time and I really thank you for the opportunity. I appreciate it.

Dr. Ariel Cohen

Senior Research Fellow, Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy, The Heritage Foundation

Thank you very much, Professor Alexander and colleagues, for inviting me here to the International Law Institute. I think the topic that we are discussing here today is extremely timely, and if Ukraine did not, so to speak, steal the show in a very tragic way, Sochi would be the leading news story today.

Also, thank goodness, we did not have a terror attack during these Olympic Games, and hopefully we won't have one. What happened in Volgograd—a city on the Volga, historic Stalingrad—several weeks before the Olympics opened, made me think that may have been an early ringer of what might happen in Sochi. I'm glad that, so far, nothing happened.

Let's put it in context. I think that Thomas Hastings, formerly of the FBI and the State Department, who spoke here before me, did a perfect job of putting the Olympic event security into context. What I will do now is shift the focus to the nature of terrorist threat at the Olympic Games.

The threat that the Russians are facing is the threat of radical Salafi and Wahhabi Islam that, until recently, wasn't home-grown. It was a transplanted brand. Islam in the Caucasus that the Russian empire confronted since it moved into the North Caucasus in the second half of the 18th century, and then again during in the long wars of the 19th century, was indeed a more moderate brand. It was the Sufi Tarikat, the Sufi orders that predominated in the North Caucasus. Those wars resulted in huge bloodshed. Hundreds of thousands and, over time, probably millions of people perished during the resistance of different ethnic groups in the North Caucasus against Russia. The last episode started in 1994 with the so-called first Chechen War that had mostly secular and nationalistic underpinnings.

The Chechens under the leadership of General Dzhokar Dudayev wanted independence just like Ukraine, Georgia and Kazakhstan had achieved their independence. But there was a catch. Chechnya was not a Union Republic; it was an autonomous republic within the Russian Federation. So, President Yeltsin said, "nyet."

I will not bore you now with all the details of how those events developed. Suffice to say that then-Defense Minister, Pavel Grachev, said that if he had a battalion of paratroops, he would retake Grozny, the capital, in four hours. It took, unfortunately, two years, over a hundred thousand victims, and probably hundreds of thousands of refugees, until the Khasavyurt ceasefire was signed in 1996. It was Russia's ignoble defeat.

Then, a fascinating thing happened before our eyes. The nationalistic movement of the Chechens transformed itself with outside intervention from the likes of Ayman al-Zawahiri, who is the current head of Al-Qaida, then the number two to Osama bin Laden. This turned the movement into an internationalized, radicalized Islamist threat. So, in 1996 the First Chechen war ended. In 1999, the Second Chechen war started, when rebels, led by the late Shamil Basayev, invaded the neighboring Dagestan. These were people already wearing green bandanas

and black flags, with their battle cry written on them: *Allahu Akbar!* In three years it transformed itself from a nationalist, mostly secular movement, led by the former Soviet army officers and generals, into a radical movement.

As a result, we witnessed instances of massive hostage taking; whole hospitals were captured, and hundreds of people, in places like Buynaksk and Pervomayskoye, were taken hostage as well. Then in 2002 there was the famous Dubrovka Theater hostage taking, which the Russian security forces botched on retake. They used unproven and untested incapacitating gas, which is not a tear gas, but something much more potent. The troops didn't understand how to use it and, most importantly for me as a former army medic, they did not deploy forward medical care utilities around the theater. They did not instruct the first responders that they were going to use the gas, supposedly for reasons of secrecy, did not deploy antidote with first responders and field hospitals. They did not have specialized equipment around the theater, and did not have specialized transport. As a result, 120 people died in a rescue. There were some rumblings, but they were quickly suppressed. I did not see any unclassified Russian lessons learned from Dubrovka.

Next, in 2004 I was among a group of Russian experts, who arrived in Moscow and then, to Novgorod, a region of Russia between St. Petersburg and Moscow. Instead of having a fancy conference, to our horror, a school in Beslan was taken hostage, and again, despite being someone with limited military background, I was horrified.

There was no perimeter established around the school, so people were walking in and out—that was shown on national TV in real time—people were walking in and out of the school, where hundreds of schoolchildren were taken hostage. Again, a botched retake. Over 300 kids and some personnel perished in the retake. Not very impressive, no serious investigation, no public lessons learned, and in the meantime, you have planes, trains, airports, automobiles and the Moscow Metro being targeted again and again with suicide bombers and bombs. The high-speed trains between Moscow and St. Petersburg were hit twice. Two planes to Volgograd were hit by female suicide bombers, who bribed a security guard, or the Russian equivalent to the TSA, with about \$100 to \$150 not to open their bags, and the planes went down. So, the threat is both homegrown and internationally connected, and clearly Sochi is a huge high priority target.

The recent Volgograd attack, apparently, was coordinated hit by suicide bombers with a control presence on the ground. The city was actually targeted 3 times: the police headquarters, the central train station, and a bus were hit. That made me very nervous because this was awfully close, time-wise, to the Sochi Games, and the MO would probably be very similar, unless they were to go for something much more sophisticated. I had a scenario in my mind about how they could hit the Games, which I don't even want to share in an open forum.

So, why didn't it happen so far, thank God? It didn't happen because for Mr. Putin it is very personal. This is the show of President Putin. He did not spare money, and you have all seen the reports, whether you trust them or not, that the cost of the Sochi Games is equivalent to all the Winter Olympics combined. There are reports by the Russian opposition, which clearly has a bone to pick here, claiming that about half of the money was stolen. I recall a conversation with the late Vitaly Shlykov, a retired Colonel of the GRU, who became an advisor to the now-

disposed Minister of Defense. I said, “Hey Vitaly, there have been a lot of publications that state that 30%-40% of military procurement is kickbacks,” and he said, “No, it is 50%-60%.”

This is something that the Russian authorities should look into, clearly, if they can. This brings up the whole different issue of the rule of law: what was the cost, and what was the additional cost of Sochi Olympics? But so far, because it is so important for the boss, and because they put over a hundred thousand security personnel into Sochi, thank goodness, nothing happened. However, it raises a question: if a hundred thousand people are in Sochi, how does it leave Moscow? How does it leave St. Petersburg? Are they open to attacks?

I think we only have three days to find out, because the closing ceremony is on the 23rd. So, if the Russians dodge the bullet, literally, this will be a great success.

Finally, allow me to plug in the forthcoming monograph on the lessons Russia learned from the insurgency in the Northern Caucasus, which will be coming out any day now from the U.S. Army War College. If you go to their website, probably in the next couple of weeks, that piece will be there.

I can only say that the lessons learned from Sochi and beyond is that every large scale sports event in any country is a target. Terrorists would target Australians who sent troops to Afghanistan, the British, the U.S., -- you name it.

I don't even know if there is a global soccer event in the Gulf, but someone may say that there is a *fatwa* against playing soccer or watching it on television. So no one is safe. Iran is not safe because some radical Sunnis are picking a bone with it. The Emirates will not be safe because Hizballah will pick a bone with them. No one is safe anymore, especially the countries that have indigenous Islamist forces, be it Algerians, Russians, or Kenyans. Whoever has these movements, has the personnel pool to recruit suicide bombers and to target these events.

Finally, Russia has a systemic problem with local Muslims, who are increasingly radicalized. I was talking to the current President of Dagestan. I chatted with him in September. Dagestan is an autonomous republic next to Chechnya. I said, “Mr. Abdulatipov, what is the percentage of your population, especially the young people, who support the Wahabi and Salafi ideology and not the traditional Caucasus-bred Sufi ideology that can, sort of, coexist with the racism and discrimination that are prevalent in Russia?” Mr. Abdulatipov, who is an old Soviet Communist Party Central Committee apparatchik, said, “25% to 30%.” I went and looked at research and it is 25% to 30%. It's a huge number.

If you take the population of the North Caucasus of 8 million and add to it the diasporas in the Russian cities, which is probably another 4 or 5 million, then we are looking at 30 percent of 13 million, which is over 4 million people. So, I'm not saying all these people are potential terrorists, but there is a percentage among the supporters who get recruited and brainwashed. The technology is there. It is a social technology, when you take people and isolate them, brainwash them, show them videos, explain to them why sacrificing their lives in the path of jihad is a good thing, and—BINGO—they are radicalized and ready to act, unfortunately.

So, what I consider is that Russia has hundreds of thousands of potential recruits like that, and Russia has to be very careful as it is going to host a big world soccer championship in 2018, among other events. This is a test. If Russia passes the Sochi test, there is a hope that other events like that can be conducted safely in the Russian Federation. If, God forbid, something happens, then Russia needs to seriously reassess the current finger pointing and the anti-American propaganda.

We saw an 84-minute long film on Russia's Channel 1 just two days ago. It is viciously anti-American. That has to stop. They need to understand that, after all the rhetoric, they are a part of the same civilization that is threatened by these evildoers. They need to understand that there is much more benefit in cooperating with us, with the Europeans, with the Israelis, with the Indians, and with the Chinese, than in pointing fingers and saying that we are somehow supportive of this disgusting terrorist threat.

Thank you very much.

Peter Roudik

Director, Global Legal Research Center, Law Library of Congress

Thank you Dr. Alexander for inviting me and for organizing this event. I will follow my co-panelists who started to talk about their background and what they're used to do at their work. I came here from the Law Library of Congress. Everybody knows that we are the largest law library. We have 3 million of books, but in addition to these 3 million of books, the fact that 60 percent of our books are in foreign languages is especially interesting. Even more, we have a staff of people, American attorneys, who had training in laws of foreign countries. They are admitted to practice law in foreign countries and can interpret foreign laws and can explain to American legislators and the American public how to resolve a problem according to the laws of a foreign country. You can hear from my accent that I am covering, in addition to my administrative duties, Russia and other former Soviet republics, and I'm a legal specialist for these jurisdictions. So being the only government employee at this panel I have to start my talk about legal framework, which was created by the Russian authorities in order to make these games secure, with a disclaimer that everything what I will say will be on my own. I will not make the Library responsible for what I am saying here.

Before we will start to talk about lessons learned from Munich, I have to say that in order to be a good learner you have to define terms. You have to come to an agreement regarding the definitions. Recently, it was a kind of confusion how different terms, different definitions were understood by the organizers of the games. For example, they promised to make the games most memorable and they made them most warm. They promised to have the most impressive games, and these games turned out to be the most expensive. They promised to have the most secure games and these games are probably the most regulated and the most monitored in regards to the behavior of athletes, spectators, and journalists.

Current laws, and I will talk mostly about three major regulations which were passed during the last half a year, control who is coming to the games, what people are doing there, how they behave, what they can say there. It's not enough to buy a ticket to go to the Olympic Games. In order to attend an event you have to get a special spectator's pass. In order to get a spectator's pass people should submit copies of their entry tickets together with a special application, and a lot of additional personal information in advance, and nobody can be sure that they will get this pass. Everyone who is older than two years of age is required have a special badge, which serves as a spectator's pass. There are reports that people who were somehow involved in different opposition related activities were denied access to the Olympics and they couldn't come to Sochi.

But even if somebody was able to get this spectator's pass and come to Sochi, there is the so called Regulation 1156 which was passed in December and entered into force in January of this year. This document is called Rules of Spectators Behavior at Official Sporting Events. It defines where people can stay at these events, what they can say, how they will express support to their team. For example, anything that is bigger than 16 inches in any dimension cannot be brought to the stadium. The regulation defines what kind of clothes spectators can wear or not wear in order to attend an event, what kind of food they can take, and what packaging is required. For example, plastic bottles are prohibited there. The Regulation specifically says about drums, loud

speakers, noise, and music equipment. This stuff cannot be taken to the stands unless special permission was received.

In order to receive a permission, people need to submit an application two days in advance. Then within the next 24 hours permissions will be issued, and local police will be notified. Fans will get a special designated place on the stands, and a person whose name will be stated in the permit as a designated individual will be allowed to keep this equipment or a drum or whatever else that will be defined in the permit. The Regulation specifies that no wording in any language can be put on this equipment and there are special provisions regarding banners and flags. For example, nothing can be longer than two yards. All mottos, inscriptions, and messages on the banners should be in Russian language or translated into Russian. And it's not enough just to translate. It doesn't matter that your team doesn't understand Russian. You have to translate and bring an official notarized certificate that your translation is exactly the same as the message you want to state. In regards to the flags, there is a special requirement. All flags should be fireproof and the fireproof certificate needs to be present and shown to local police. Otherwise a person will be removed from the stands.

If because of all these restrictions somebody will decide not to go to the games and will send something to his friends who went to Sochi, it cannot be done so easy also. There is a special regulation, under which all mail sent to Sochi should be unsealed. You probably read recently in the New York Times that Chobani yogurt was not allowed to be received by American athletes because some postal service regulations were violated. I would say that many of these regulations are in violation of original Russian laws, but they were passed and are enforced in Sochi today.

Recently, the Guardian published an article saying that there is a deafening silence in Sochi in regards to political protests and political statements. It is obvious why it happened so. Last August, Putin issued a special decree, which prohibited all non-Olympics related gatherings in Sochi and neighboring territories through the end of March. Later, this decree was amended and a special area about ten miles away from Sochi was designated for conducting protest events. At the same time, Russian law which allows people to conduct single man protest, pickets, and other events was not repealed. However, local police strongly prosecute such events and you can see media reports that people were detained for doing such type of activities. There is another regulation which I want to mention to you. It was passed last November and regulates eavesdropping in Sochi. Eleven thousand cameras, drones, and eavesdropping equipment are probably another reason why you can hear this defining silence in the region.

Probably you read the report that all computers of our NBC team which covers Olympics were hacked immediately as they connected to public Wi-Fi in Sochi. That is because of this November regulation called On Specifics of Providing Communication Services in Sochi. This regulation authorizes Russian security services to collect all data and metadata gathered by operators and providers of communication services. This regulation specifies that all journalists, members of official delegations, athletes, judges, and spectators are subject to monitoring. According to regulation, all records of connections, sending messages and even information on payments made to get these communications shall be recorded in a special database, and this data

will be kept for the next three years allowing 24/7 remote access to the Russian Federal Security Service.

Two Russian investigative journalists reported about this system in the Western media and what was the response of the Russian government? The official Russian government website, Voice of Russia, published on its website a statement saying, “Don’t be scared of phone tapping during Sochi, it’s for your own safety.” Well, maybe it is for the safety, but to what degree is it legal ? Russia doesn’t have its own federal intelligence court of review. So who will monitor use of this data? I want to add that Russia’s own Supreme Court issued guidance, which says that all metadata collected in regards to electronic communications, telephone numbers, and information on electronic traffic should be considered personal, private information and collecting of this information requires court orders. Of course in the case of Sochi it is not done.

So is the lesson learned? I don’t know. Olympic Games are continuing, nothing happened yet, and hopefully nothing will happen until the end. But we should make sure that measures which were undertaken by the Russian government are within the existing legal framework, and that rights of those who are protected by implemented security measures will not be abused or misused for the sake of security. Thank you.

Professor Ellen M. Zavian

Professor of Sports Law, George Washington University; President of EZ Negotiation Institute

Well, I am always honored to come back, and, after hearing all the speakers prior to me, I have this sense of fear to come up here and share with you that our students go to the Olympics every year with Professor Delpy Neirotti and I'm happy to say they are back today. So I can talk about this a little bit more freely. But, they go and they experience all the Olympic movement from a sponsorship and marketing standpoint, a security standpoint, which we never used to cover. And so they get to meet with CEOs from different sponsors and vendors and it's a wonderful program but I remember my students talking a couple weeks ago, "did you contact the State Department?" "We have to get our names in!" and "We can't go without it!" and I remember fifteen years ago when we were taking the students, that wasn't even a discussion. And so, what has happened in my own personal class, I've been teaching since 1996 or something of that sort, that I never used to even cover security. Most of my class was anti-trust laws, contracts, torts in the sports arena, and safety was the closest "s" that we came to from the security standpoint. Now I co-teach one of my classes with another professor at GW who's sadly retiring, Professor Greg Shaw, who also was in the military and he teaches in the risk management side of the engineering department at GW. So, if you would have asked me fifteen years ago, would I have ever really focused one of my sixteen classes on security and risk management and so forth I probably would have said, "Are you kidding me? Anti-trust is the most important thing that's going on." So, without further ado, I want to cover various things that I would tell my students, in my class, that we cover security.

One of the things – I'm going to focus on five things just so everyone knows the beginning to the end. The Safety Act, which we talked a little bit about last time; the International Security Events Group (ISEG), which Tom mentioned; the ICSS, which is an organization in Qatar which we'll talk about a little bit and I'll show you the website. Then, what's happening in Sochi with our students and the athletes and so forth. And then, what does this mean for future games because when I teach I basically tell my students, "This is all the precedent and the current, but it's going to be up to you to figure out where we are headed in the future; cause I'm hoping I'm long retired like Tom very soon." So, I'm pushing them to be the creative ones.

So let's talk about the Homeland Security Act of 2002 where they really began to build this – and I'm going to read it because it's a very long title. I thought the USOC had acronyms that were long until I got in to the terrorism world; those acronyms stump me quite often. The Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Emerging Technologies Act of 2002. It's also known as the SAFTEY Act. So, we'll stick to that since its two letters, SA, easy enough. So what was this act? This act was really passed by Congress, obviously to protect from anti-terrorism, but it was more about fostering technologies in the anti-terrorism community, to really foster the development of technologies. Because, what companies are going to get in and really develop the R&D needed

for these technologies that facilities need and so forth, if they know they are going to be sued if it fails? The Act basically created an immunity for the technology companies to come into the foreplay and to begin developing really unique facility technologies.

So who was the first team to – let’s see if you were paying attention last year [addressing Prof. Alexander] - who was the first team who ever got certified under the Safety Act? Do you remember? The New York Yankees. Should not surprise you. And George is probably looking down and saying, “of course, we’re always the first in everything.” So, the Yankees got a certificate under the Safety Act which actually expires in 2017; and what this does, it promotes the creation and deployment of anti-terrorism technologies in their facilities. So, in their case they own their facilities but don’t be fooled because there are actually some stadiums that aren’t owned by the team, they’re rented for a dollar in exchange for tax breaks and so forth. So, you really have to know who owns the facility and is this Safety Act Certificate really worthwhile because there is a cost to it. The cost is deploying all these technologies on a yearly basis, they have to keep them updated, they have to report in to Homeland Security, and every so many years they have to renew. But, there is another side to it that’s sort of fascinating. Once they get certified their insurance premiums go down. So, I would love to see the cost of implementing those technologies to how much their insurance goes down. And why does their insurance go down? Because now they’re immune from a lawsuit if a terrorist act should happen in their facility; the patrons, the vendors, the sponsors cannot sue.

I know Tom is ready to jump in because you’re going to know much more about this than me but I was a little bit shocked when the Yankees were one of the first because I kind of felt the act was really for the technologies to be immune but sports always jumps in if there is something advantageous because we’re all about winning, at any cost sometimes. So, since then, there have been other sports entities that have gotten certificates under the Safety Act: the Mets, which comes under the Queen’s Ballpark Company, and basically it is designed to detect, deter, prevent, respond, and mitigate acts of terrorism at City Field. But interestingly enough, it doesn’t only cover the events that are associated with the Mets, it covers all events that are at that facility, so that means non-season special events, concerts, and so forth. It also hires and trains their employees and their independent contractors to maintain that certificate. But not to be outdone by the Mets, across the water of my hometown, New Jersey, the new Meadowland Stadium is also certified under the Safety Act: game days, non-game days, and special events; and you all know the Super Bowl took place there so they were protected as well. Major League Baseball also took out a certificate for the Kauffman Stadium in Kansas City which involved the All Star event for 2013. And the National Football League should not be outdone by Major League Baseball so the NFL puts together guidelines, standards, and credentials that the facilities and the team-owners need to adhere to; but the teams and the facilities need to get their separate certificate, the NFL has their certificate more to cover things like the Super Bowl or the Super Bowl events that surround it as well as even down to the parking lot at a facility is covered under

the Safety Act. But the NFL has this Security Evaluation and Compliance Program that they then educate the security teams at each facility of each team. So, what does this mean? Is this the only way that teams are protecting themselves?

Well, we've got some traditional ways, which is a ticket waiver, so every time you turn around your ticket you see a waiver that says even act of terrorism is now in the waiver, didn't used to be, that you are waiving your right to sue that particular team or facility. The other way is just federal or state immunity. Immunity has existed for federal and state entities and, like I said, a lot of stadiums are owned by the state and not necessarily the team. So there is some immunity as well there. And then lastly, you can't forget just traditional worker's comp insurance and how the workers are protected versus the vendors and the independent contractors, you try to push the liability over to the vendors and the ICs. So, wrapping that up, I think that there is going to be more and more facilities and teams being certified under this Safety Act. And so, last year I came with one, this year I've got about six or seven, so maybe by next year, if you invite me back, I'll have about twenty more or something of that sort.

So let's go on to a little bit of what Tom was talking about which was the International Security Events Group. It's a group that has gotten together, it's under the Homeland Security Group and its basically twenty or so agencies that get together and discuss main events, and I think what has been said here before, it is not solely about the Olympics, it's about any event that aggregates a large crowd that could be attractive, particularly if the media is going to provide a stage for their acts. So basically, this ISEG group coordinates things like credentials, travel warnings, which you all heard regarding Sochi and the travel to Russia, evacuation plans are planned out, if we have an event here how are visas going to be processed and they estimated at the games in Italy, it was about sixteen million dollars spent on security through the ISEG group, so that's quite a bit. But I do agree with what's been said here that the Winter Games does not attract as much as the Summer Games do. And, to be quite honest with you, the Summer Games have a lot more athletes. I represented the women's soccer players, the women's softball players, and it was in 1996 and there was not a high level of security; I got into many events without tickets, if I can say that, and today that wouldn't be the case at all. So, world has changed.

What about the ICSS? So, if we can just look at their homepage. The ICSS I got to know after I spoke last year, I was introduced to this group and I was like, "What do you do?" They are the International Center for Security, Safety, and Integrity in Sport, and I've gotten to know their lead people and they're opening an office here in DC and the gentleman that founded it is Mohammad Hanzab. And basically, they want to be the global sort of meeting hub for safety, security, and integrity. So, it's easy to think about what security is because we've been talking about it today but how does safety play a role? And this ICSS is in Qatar so it's sort of off the beaten path, but they have clearly funded this to a considerable amount. Security, easy; safety, we're talking about maybe concussions that have been in the news quite a bit and where that's

going to lead for different sports, particularly in soccer which is a global sport, because very few people watch NFL even though in this country it's the biggest thing. And, the other thing that integrity really goes to – I was kind of diving into what is integrity of sports – but it kind of - and I'd love to hear what the panel has to say – intersects into security a little bit. It talks about price-fixing and the integrity of the pureness of the sport. And why I think that connects a little is because the individuals that are paying off in the gambling and the price-fixing to throw a card at a soccer game or pay off a ref because there is a gamble that's going to pay off “x”, a lot of times those same individuals are also involved in the terrorism side. So, I see that as a joint area that maybe hasn't been mentioned but should be considered going forward. If integrity of sports is hampered, people will not go to watch a game because people go to games because of the unknown factor and the fairness. And so, it is critical that we keep integrity in our sports, otherwise viewership will decline and participation will decline. The other thing that's been mentioned is: what about the Sochi games themselves?

So, I know Peter talked about a lot of things that I had no idea all these rules and regulations I used to say by the time you read about all the rules and regulations the games will be done. And we can't forget about the Paralympic Games, so even though there are three days left of the Olympic Games, I represent a Paralympic athlete and I never like to forget them because they're just as important, and slightly more important to me in many ways. In the process of bidding for the Games, there are different sections in the process and there is one sections which is called Stage 1, Theme 12, and, in that section, it absolutely mandates that the hosting country guarantees - makes two guarantees: one of it is to the highest government authority is going to oversee the safety and “peaceful” celebration of the Olympic Games and the Paralympic Games. So there are other things that come in to factor, whether it's customs, immigration, formalities, environment, the weather is also considered, finance, marketing, sport but obviously those two guarantees are important. What does that guarantee mean? Well, it means that, in this case, the IOC required Russia to create a separate entity, sort of a committee, it was an Olympic Security Steering Committee and this coordination center, this hub, was going to be establishing the security plan and delivering it. And this inter-agency, operational sort of headquarters hub had the FSB, which is the Federal Security Service, was the lead agency, the interior, which would be the police ministry, the emergencies ministry, the defense ministry, and other bodies. So what does that come down to? Well, it was reported that there was about a hundred thousand troops, vehicles, aircrafts, and so forth in Sochi, but rumbles have said that there were much more than what were reported.

So what does the U.S. do? The U.S. obviously wants to get the athletes over there and home safely. But what's interesting, that has evolved in the last few years is that National Governing Bodies of each sport have begun to hire their own security teams. And, that is so important because the NGB's have never budgeted for that type of private security. For example the Ski and Snowboard, they hired a company called Global Rescue. But when we take a step

back and think about the National Governing Bodies that don't have that budget to protect their athletes on an individual basis. Does it mean the athletes may consider, or the agents through the athletes, might consider providing some private protection. The NHL sent their own security team over for the NHL players and usually the leagues have former FBI individuals running their security teams so they're in good hands. But what about curling? Bobsled? Luge? All those other people. We really have to think about how we are going to reinvent - are the NGB's going to get together and create an insurance pool? Are they going to create a pool where they hire a security company at a much better rate than doing it individually? These are things that I want my students to think about going forward. Is this an area that they are interested in and they can be in the forefront?

Lastly, what's the future of the Games? Anita Defrantz sued the USSC when Carter boycotted the Games in the 70's and the courts basically said, "It's a privilege to perform at the Games, not a right" and therefore she lost her case. She sits on the board of the IOC so I don't think she lost too much and she's very powerful but I think what's more important about it is the athletes, if we boycott the games for any reason, for safety purposes, we say, "we're not going to send a contingency over," if the athletes would sue that they're going, we have some precedent law that states it's a privilege, not a right. So, what does it mean for DC and Baltimore, which is where we are? Well, we are looking at bidding for a Summer Game and that will be critical because the security alone in a non-DC area is massive. Can you imagine the security that we would need here and what kind of budget we would need? So look for that bid and that discussion and maybe in a couple of years we can talk about it if they formally submit their bid. And really what's the best place in the country? I think that's something that's really going to be considered as well. Where's the best place in the country that we can have a secure location? I think Utah was fairly simply whereas DC, Baltimore and Richmond bid would be massive and we might have to bring Tom out of retirement to do those three areas. [To Tom] "As long as I come with you, I'm good to go." We talked about what are the National Governing Bodies going to do, but what are the IF's going to do? The IF's are the International Federations, like FIFA, and are they going to pool resources as well? Are they going to begin to put a budget together? And what are universities going to do, perhaps seek certificates under the Safety Act as well. And lastly, I'm glad our students came back, they're safe and sound, and actually GW media told us that we should not speak about security and terrorism while our students are over there so I thank you for having it on the perfect day which is today, and they come back yesterday. One of the proudest things I can tell you is that the next speaker was a former student of mine, so someone was paying attention in my class.

Professor Bradley S. Shear

Adjunct Professor in the MBA program at The George Washington University and member of Harvard Law School's Berkman Center for Internet and Society's Online Media Legal Network

Thank you, Ellen. I am a former student of Ellen's approximately 16 years ago I think it was, a long time ago. I would like to give a little bit about my background because that might be helpful since everyone has spoken a little bit about their own background. I am a practicing lawyer. I also teach at George Washington University. I teach a sports management class in the MBA program. I focus a lot of my practice on privacy and security issues, and I deal a lot with digital crisis management and digital risk management. Those are some issues that these past Olympics have brought about and several of our speakers here today have focused on the physical aspects, and I believe Peter spoke about some of the digital issues, especially the laws that have been put in place. What I am going to try to do is talk about the role of the media along with some of the different social and digital media issues that have come into play in the past Olympics, and the current Olympics that are going on, because I think that it is helpful in really understanding where our security concerns are currently and where they are going to be moving forward.

When you look back, I think you have to first think about the media's role in the 1972 Olympics in Munich, and that was really the television age. You have to think about, the security issues were focused on how do we protect the physical venue. From '72 I think the next biggest step was in '96 Olympics in Atlanta because that was really the cable age, especially with Atlanta being the hub of Ted Turners' media empire. You have to think of the Olympics at that aspect as focused a lot on cable issues. Well, here comes 9/11, and another aspect of my background is that I was down at the World Trade Center in that area on 9/11 and became homeless because of the terrorist attacks. I saw the whole thing and actually took some photographs and ran for my life along with tens of thousands other New Yorkers.

My experience that day provided me the knowledge about some of the things we have to think about as practitioners of trying to protect ourselves and what are the possible things that potentially could happen on the ground for different types of events. The problem is that you have to try to plan for the unexpected. I believe that it was Peter who might have said something to the effect that the issues in Greece with the amount of money they spent was exorbitant and the US may have been so called "sounding the alarm" that they need to spend that kind of money.

Well the thing is I am glad they spent that type of money, even though some people came out and said that is too much for security. My feeling is that you can never be too safe. As a parent of two children, I never want them to have to experience the types of issues that I did on 9/11. I never want to see anyone who participates at the Olympics or attends other sporting events to ever experience the types of things that happened in Munich and also in Atlanta. So as far as I am concerned the amount of money that is spent at the Olympics regarding security is very well spent. My hope is that there is more attention paid to digital issues and the digital security of the Olympics. In my opinion it is something that is a growing threat that the members in this room are going to have to deal with and focus with going forward.

When you think about some of these other issues, I want to talk about in 2008, the Beijing Olympics. That was the first time we had the so-called beginning of the social media age in the Olympics. Then in 2010 and 2012, we had the so called “Social Media Olympics” and that’s when a lot of organizers started to think how we are going to protect our athletes basically from saying dumb things online. Well besides that, you have people that want to do some evil things that are posting videos on YouTube about the things they want to do at the Olympics. Then you have these Olympics, the 2014 Olympics in Sochi, when they are really called, in my opinion, the surveillance Olympics because now we are at a point where we are trying to figure out, ok, what are the best ways to protect us?

We have this big issue of privacy versus security. How much is too much? I’ve personally advocated for very strong privacy laws in this country such as the social media username and password laws that have been enacted in 15 states and introduced in 40 and in Congress. I helped start that trend. However, I see how important it is to really understand that you have to give up some of your privacy to ensure that you have security. That is something that I think everyone in this room understands. We want to protect our Olympians and protect those who attend the games; unfortunately they are going to have to give up some of their privacy to ensure they are secure in attending the games and hopefully good things will happen while they’re at the games. Meaning they’ll win Olympic medals without having to worry about some of the overriding terrorist issues that are out there. Those are some of the issues I’m going to talk about, and since the hour is getting late, I’m just going to be very brief.

I have a couple of slides that I would actually like to share with you if you could cue up. Like when I brought up digital surveillance, it was spoken about earlier that approximately \$48-50 billion dollars were spent to put on these Olympics. How much of that is with digital surveillance? I just don’t know. Maybe in the next couple of years some hard figures will come out. As Peter said earlier, just about everything that is being done digitally in Sochi is being collected, all of the meta data, and someone is looking at it. The FSB has some type of program called SORM (System of Operative-Investigative Measures), which does similar things as the US version of PRISM, which came out in the documents Snowden ended up leaking to the press last year.

It is these types of issues, digital surveillance, and making sure that we are well protected that I believe is very important and is something that is going to only increase, with the fact that everyone is using one of these [holds up cell phone]? How many people here have a cell phone? I believe everyone does. If I am not mistaken I don’t think anyone in this room lives without a cell phone. There was a really funny piece that Jerry Seinfeld did, I believe it was last night on the Tonight Show, where he talked about cell phones—how everyone is walking around with them. That is how it is at the Olympics and every single sporting event these days. Everyone has one of these and that is why we need to think about these issues collectively and try to figure out what the best practices out there to try and protect our athletes and attendees and the people who are on the ground physically protecting people at the Olympics.

Those of you who are active social media users, one thing that I would always recommend is that you have to really understand what is going on out there. One of the hash tags that has really come into play during these Olympics is #Sochifail. Basically there has been a whole bunch of

very interesting things that have happened while at Sochi. One of the things which this shows is the Pussy Riot band members. I guess you can call them Pussy Rioters because of some of the things that they did. They are just a rock band who was protesting against some of the human rights issues in Russia, especially the anti-gay laws that are in place and some of the other laws; they were arrested and put in jail for a couple of days. Yesterday, I believe it was, they came out and they did some type of de facto performance, and then the Cossacks came out and they literally beat them up. This issue got a lot of press and went viral. If you go online and take look at the hash tag #Sochifail, you will find everyone talking about that. What a lot of people need to realize is that when you make a big deal about something, especially this day in age with social media, it becomes a big deal. If the Russian security forces just ignored this and let them come out and do their little dance and song, it wouldn't have been a big deal and I would not be talking about it here today. The entire world would not have covered the issue.

It's not only that. There were a couple of other interesting issues, like a bobsledder who got stuck in the bathroom, I don't have that on the slide, but basically he got stuck in the bathroom and he literally came out and barreled through the door. Then one of the other issues that came up, I don't have that as a slide, but there were two toilets next to each other. As far as a privacy/security issue, there could be some argument about whether that is a privacy or security issue here. It just goes to show you that anything you do in this day and age could end up online. (Yes. That's what I was talking about (referring to picture behind him)). These are the issues that you have to understand when you are planning for the Olympics that you can't just prepare for the so-called physical security, but you also have to keep in mind the digital security and the digital issues out there because that is becoming more important in my opinion when you are trying to figure out the best way to deploy our resources.

It's something that I find very fascinating and I do a lot with this with my different clients. Here, this is when I talk about different types of security issues, for example this deals with the Boston Marathon bombings, the tragic case that happened last year. You have to think about, well wait a minute, there's all of this really cool crowd sourcing information, everyone is posting photos online, everyone is taking a picture with one of these, and how can we work together to find the so-called terrorist or the bombers. The problem was that social media can be used for good, and it can help with security and hopefully try to help find the bombers, but it can also be misinterpreted. Unfortunately because of some of the crowd sourcing, the New York Post and some other different media outlets incorrectly named the wrong bombers. It is a double edged sword, social media and digital platforms and tools so that is why you really need to think about how are we going to handle these issues when we are dealing with large sporting events, especially with the Olympics. My biggest takeaway from here is that I would hope that everyone thinks more about these issues and really tries to figure out the best way to not only protect the athletes, attendees and venues from physical issues out there but also the digital issues. I think this is something that we need to collectively think about so we can resolve on a national and international basis.

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Please contact the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 901 North Stuart Street Suite 200 Arlington, VA 22203
Tel.: 703-525-0770 Email: yalexander@potomac institute.org, ICTS@potomac institute.org