

# INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN COMBATING TERRORISM: REVIEW OF 2015 AND OUTLOOK FOR 2016



INTER-UNIVERSITY CENTER  
FOR  
**TERRORISM**  
STUDIES



**International Cooperation in**  
**Combating Terrorism:**  
**Review of 2015 and Outlook for 2016**

Table of Contents

Lieutenant General Vincent R. Stewart..... 1  
Governor Thomas J. Ridge ..... 6  
Senator Joseph I. Lieberman..... 10

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**Lieutenant General Vincent R. Stewart**

*Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance*

Combating terrorism is unmistakably an important topic on everyone's mind. Today's engagement is a significant opportunity for sharing and debating ideas, defining the threat, and identifying opportunities to undermine forces that use terror. I've heard definitions of the threat ranging from all of Islam to parcels within it.

I'd like to highlight the Defense Intelligence Agency's role in understanding and countering this terrorist threat.

Terrorism is not only a grave threat to international security; it is a direct assault on humanity. During our lifetime, we have witnessed individual acts of ideologically, politically motivated terrorism transform into a continuum of sheer barbarism covering vast areas and territory, and shrouded in religious symbolism.

Although terrorism is not new, it is a reality with increasing intensity especially since the time I put on my uniform during the early 1980s.

From Hamas to Hizballah, to Al-Qa'ida and now the self-proclaimed Islamic State, terror is used as a violent tool to advance criminal and politically intimidating strategies.

The recent Paris, Beirut, San Bernardino, Mali and Jakarta attacks demonstrate that Daesh, ISIL, ISIS, or whatever you'd like to call them – now has become a direct terrorist threat around the world especially in Europe and here in America. More information is coming out about Daesh operatives allegedly already here on U.S. soil. So, these recent attacks may be just the beginning of violence perpetrated by Daesh, by their inspired lone wolf actors and by returning foreign fighter terrorists, or Daesh coordinated and directed attacks.

In Daesh, we see what our analysts call a 'proto-state'. We are simultaneously confronting both a quasi-military force with state-like features and a transnational terrorist organization driven by a religious ideology. Like a state, it claims territories, attempts to control its borders, it has an executive, a command & control structure, a set of laws, a taxation system, it builds an army and supposedly provides services.

While not recognized as a state by modern nation-state standards, it has been recognized by affiliates around the world who have accepted Daesh's goals of a global caliphate.

Daesh has advanced this notion by marrying its technological capabilities with ideological incitement to transform also cyberspace into another dimension of the battlespace – one with immediate effects on non-traditional battlefields marked by terrorist attacks all over the world.

The idea that the caliphate exists both in the physical and virtual domain is Daesh's center of gravity.

Last year, Daesh remained entrenched on Iraqi and Syrian battlefields and expanded globally to Libya, the Sinai, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the Caucasus. It even inspired terrorist attacks in Beirut at approximately the same timeframe as the Paris attack. This year Daesh is growing more dangerous through emergent branches in Mali, Tunisia, Somalia, Bangladesh, and Indonesia. It would not be a surprise to see them expand into Egypt too.

Daesh is likely to increase the pace and lethality of its transnational attacks because it seeks to unleash violent action and to provoke a harsh reaction from the West, thereby feeding its distorted narrative.

We know Daesh does not represent Islam or the 1.5 billion Muslims around the world – and yet Daesh claims to be creating by force a Caliphate – the “true Caliphate” – a notion that is resonating among very select segments of the Sunni community who advocate ‘violent Salafi jihadism’. It is important to note that it takes all three of these words together to describe the current threat environment.

In this setting, Daesh seeks not only to pit the West and Islam but to stroke sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shias, not so different from the violence of Shia jihadist groups such as Hizballah. These groups seek to create a chaotic environment in which the groups can thrive.

These threats are exacerbated by the security challenges of the Middle East, which is now facing one of the most dangerous and unpredictable periods in the last decade.

Middle East countries face simultaneous internal and external threats including terrorism, subnational armed groups or insurgencies, and conventional military threats. Some nations have even attempted to eliminate their political or sectarian adversaries under the guise of combating terrorists.

While Daesh might be at the forefront of our thoughts today, they are not the only nefarious organization in town. Increased international focus on Daesh allows Al-Qa'ida to recover from its degraded state, and it enables similar groups to flourish. We must not forget Al-Qa'ida and its affiliates still exist, we cannot count them out: Al-Qa'ida along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula, Al-Qa'ida in the Maghreb, and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria. While they may not have advanced their goals in the mindset of a caliphate, similar ideology and analogous tools of terror drive them.

Furthermore, the jury is still out on the largest state sponsor of terrorism – Iran and its affiliates. We do not know yet if Iran will behave responsibly, or how it will invest its 50 to 100 billion US dollars resulting from the JCPOA. Let's not forget that since January 19, 1984, Iran has been listed as a state sponsor of terror and until September 11, 2001 – it had killed more Americans than any other terrorist

organization.

We will not take our eye off these threats.

We also face uncertainty in South Asia – the Taliban has launched its first-ever winter offensive in order to make a comeback in Afghanistan, and it has increased attacks in Pakistan. Daesh is also attempting to expand their enterprise into South and Central Asia, and Southeast Asia.

Drawing your attention to Africa, I see a volatile security environment due to dysfunctional political systems and conflict – creating permissive environments for transnational terrorism.

In North Africa, years of civil conflict over political control of Libya and an expanding violent Salafi jihadist presence remain the most pressing security concerns. Even there, Daesh has established a stronghold in Surt, Libya causing instability and increasing illicit activities, and increasing activities in Algeria.

West Africa's Sahel and Lake Chad regions are also contending with a number of violent Salafi jihadist groups. The recent terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso and the November 2015 attack on a major hotel in Mali highlight the expanded terrorism threat. In Nigeria and the greater Lake Chad region, terror attacks by Boko Haram, also known as the Islamic State West Africa Province, who are the most violent Daesh affiliate, which is saying a great deal, are likely to continue especially since their alliance with Daesh.

Parts of central and eastern Africa remains at risk of instability over the next year. Al-Shabaab attacks and control of rural areas will persist in Somalia. The risk of episodic violence in the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan and Sudan will continue despite peace and stability efforts.

The key causes of instability – aging authoritarian leaders, lack of political transparency, corruption, suffocated civil societies, violation of human rights, religious extremism, insufficient economic opportunity, and sparse social mobility are some among many and will continue to serve as drivers for civil conflict, social cleavages, instability spillover, and regional spoilers' involvement. Daesh plays upon all of these issues.

These terrorists threats and the drivers of conflict alone – not taking into account the myriad other global security concerns and state actors, the economy, and technology have profound of the way DIA shapes, sizes, its form, and function of the DIA's mission – *“to provide intelligence on foreign militaries and operating environments that delivers decision advantage to prevent and decisively win wars.”* We are one of three all-source agencies, and the only one, that effectively incorporates operations, analysis, and science and technology to support this mission.

We face a complex security environment marked by a broad spectrum of disparate threats from aggressive nation-states to adaptive non-state actors. Many of

these threats bridge more than one of the warfighting domains and span across multiple categories, and global regions. All of these have implications for future joint, interagency, multinational and public partnerships at all levels especially how military power will be used for example to counter terrorism in “gray zones” – whether we are talking about the mountains of Afghanistan or throughout cyberspace. In addition, while efforts continue in the military realm, military action is not only sufficient because diplomacy through collaboration is also a force multiplier.

Therefore, we must rethink how we do business. We have to take a broader approach to partnerships. Collaboration across the services and the whole-of-government is no longer enough – fully integrated partnerships with our key allied nations is now an imperative.

Our relationships with our allies, our military responses, and the way that we practice intelligence must therefore adapt and posture for the future.

We must be prepared to operate with greater speed, flexibility, jointness, partnership, and accuracy. The way to do that is through integration – not as an end-state but as a means to an end.

To address this challenge, the DIA and our intelligence partners have moved toward Integrated Intelligence Centers – sitting analysts next to collectors, collections managers, engineers, technologists, and mission support experts in close contact with the full array of intelligence capabilities. This operating model reflects the success we experienced on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. It best suits our future challenges because it empowers our center leaders to effectively manage the entire intelligence cycle – from end-to-end – maximizing efficiency and effectiveness. This creates a cohesive, collaborative operating model that can truly deliver decision advantage.

One such example is our Defense Combating Terrorism Center (DCTC) – our functionally focused Integrated Intelligence Center. DCTC as it is called works in close unison with the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) and our forward deployed military forces, especially the Special Operations Forces. Our DCTC integrates critical defense analysis, targeting, and collection to enable warning, operational decisions, precise action within the warfighter’s operating environment against terrorists and their networks. We maintain a broad set of capabilities that aid personnel recovery, exploit captured materials and build identity intelligence.

We are also integrating our foreign partners because in today’s complex security environment, we cannot understand the world without them. When it comes to our Five Eyes (FVEY) and other key international partners, it is unlikely we will go to war again without them. We will be in combat as a coalition, so why shouldn’t we fight and be fully integrating them into our intelligence organizations?

Almost two years ago in March 2014, we stood up our FVEY Center tasked with integrating DIA and Commonwealth capabilities to the maximum extent permitted by Department of Defense (DoD) policies and guidance. The FVEY Center

advocates improvements to warning, collection, analysis, crisis planning, operations, and information technology.

DIA is on the forefront of international intelligence integration. The more we can expand FVEY opportunities and other key partners integration across organizations, the more we can advance effective policies and operations. Our goal is to take DIA from FVEY enclave to becoming an agency that works and thinks as a FVEY agency.

We are also taking unprecedented 'additional steps' in intelligence sharing beyond the FVEY community. Take for example our collaboration with France, our oldest ally. We have maintained a close relationship with France not just recently as a result of the Paris attacks – but before in countering terrorism around the world whether Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, or North Africa. We also maintain many bilateral intelligence sharing and other relationships with other partners throughout the world. Partnerships with majority Muslim countries are vital to gain a holistic understanding and to foster regional capabilities.

Integration, innovation, and modernization give us an edge given the multitude of challenges we face ahead.

Yet, we have to be able to stay ahead of the news cycle and deliver a compelling case to decision-makers so that they can make sound decisions. If we can't, then policymakers will choose piecemeal or biased information from outside sources over an informed intelligence picture.

In closing, I'd like to focus on the subject at hand and take a moment to share another view of this current terrorist phenomenon. On December 2<sup>nd</sup> of this past year, in the British House of Commons, Shadow Foreign Secretary Sir Hilary Benn spoke of his support in action against Daesh.

While he explained that Daesh poses a clear and present threat, his description of the enemy was more striking:

*“And we are here faced by fascists. Not just their calculated brutality, but their belief that they are superior to every single one of us in this chamber tonight, and all of the people that we represent. They hold our belief in tolerance and decency in contempt. They hold our democracy... in contempt. And what we know about fascists is that they need to be defeated.”*

The Caliphate must be destroyed and Daesh defeated. This is definitely something to think about, debate and come to a better understanding.

**Governor Thomas J. Ridge**

*First Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and became the first Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Also, former Governor of Pennsylvania. Currently, Chairman of Ridge Global and Co-Chair of the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense*

So, you know, ladies and gentleman, Senator Lieberman and I were asked to co-chair the Panel, but one of the preconditions to accepting both the opportunity and the responsibility was that we did not just want to write one more "Washington Report." We insisted that we also, upon the conclusion of the effort and the writing of the report, that we make very specific, very specific short and long term recommendations to the Congress of the United States – we felt that strongly about it. So I am grateful to be here with my friend Senator Lieberman and we look forward to – both he and I, and the panel look forward to – working with the Institute as we take these recommendations and hopefully convince the Congress of the United States how serious it is.

You know, I do not know how many of you figured that when you showed up today you would have this great briefing from General Stewart about, perhaps, the kinetic threat of terrorism. And we all know there is a digital threat, as you pointed out - we live in the digital world and in the physical world. But there is another world of concern that we addressed in the Panel and that is the world of bioterrorism. It is one of the lesser-discussed aspects of the terrorist threat, but after a year of inquiry, not just in Washington D.C., but around the United States, we concluded that the threat is real, it is growing, and frankly, given the nature of the threat, we do not think that the country is sufficiently prepared for it.

And one of the interesting challenges in trying to frame this for the body politic and for Congress, frankly, whether the threat, the pathogen, is thrown at you by Mother Nature or a terrorist group, the impact and the consequences are the same. So, to a certain extent, it was a dual-use Panel. Whether you are dealing with the Zika virus or you are dealing with a bio attack from a terrorist, we are still not adequately prepared, regardless of the source of the attack. And Mother Nature reminds us regularly of the global need to combat contagious pathogens, regardless of the origin, regardless of the source.

Nature is already forcing us to deal with a great many infectious diseases. We all witnessed the events of the last two years as Ebola ravaged three countries in western Africa and crossed continents to reach Europe and the United States.

Ladies and gentleman, shortly after I accepted the opportunity to work with President Bush as Assistant to the President for Homeland Security (this is in 2001), I was the recipient of (obviously I drank from a fire hose through) a lot of briefings, and one of the briefings included the pathogens that we should be concerned about, that if they fell in the hands of the terrorists, we might have to deal with. Now this is 2001 and early 2002, and one of those pathogens was Ebola. You draw your own conclusions – if we thought it serious enough then in 2001 and 2002 – whether as a country we had the

infrastructure to identify and respond as quickly as we could in 2014 and 2015. So there has been an awareness out there for quite some time.

Think about in 2003, SARS began in China; zoonotic, based on the zoonotic episode. It took a while for the global community to become aware of it because it took a while for the authorities in China to let the World Health Organization know.

Avian influenza returned to our poultry facilities in the Midwest again this year.

And now we have the news about the Zika virus. Again, I think, much congratulations and it is admirable that the Administration has recognized the need, understands that resources are absolutely essential to deal with it, but – if hopefully you listen to some of our recommendations and I will let Senator Lieberman conclude and then we can do the Q&A – once again, it is reflexive. And one of the purposes of the panel, one of the purposes of the commission, is to build an infrastructure internally, both from a scientific and technical point of view, and a medical infrastructure point of view, so that when these things happen you may need emergency appropriations, but you do not have to scramble multiple agencies and multiple political appointees in order to bring specific focus on a potential pathogen.

I do not think we should forget, as well, the ever-present danger from pandemic influenza, the rise of antibiotic resistant organisms (like Extremely Drug Resistant Tuberculosis), and let us not forget about the spread of disease syndromes like SARS and MERS.

Meanwhile, the terrorist threat simmers quietly, but just as insidiously as ever before. The aspect of the bio-threat – the combination of intent and capability to use biological weapons – is pretty difficult to quantify. I think we all understand and agree on that. It is an enormous challenge to collect intelligence on the development of bio-weapons. How does our country or any country for that matter know whether someone working with pathogens in a laboratory is working for the benefit of that community and the world, or to its detriment? The dual-use problem is hard enough to tackle here in the United States' labs no less than labs in makeshift facilities in foreign countries.

Now here are some of the open-source facts about this threat of which you may be aware, but it bears repeating. We know that al-Qa'ida sought to develop biological weapons. They launched a program in Afghanistan to develop anthrax into a mass-casualty weapon. The U.S. discovered evidence of that unsuccessful, or maybe just not fully realized, program after our military entered. We know that ISIL has publicly espoused the value of biological weapons for their ability to cause massive loss of life. And they have certainly expressed their intent to use such weapons. We know, according to the Intelligence Community and the Department of State, that China, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Syria all continue to engage in suspicious dual-use or biological weapons-specific activities that we believe are in violation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

We know, that caches of incompletely destroyed or buried biological weapons materials from old state programs can now be accessed again and then smuggled to other regions for use in today's wars by proxies, which include some of today's terrorists. And we know that ISIL now possesses what it needs to get a biological weapons program going: a large enough piece of land that can be both controlled and secured; physical infrastructure, like labs and manufacturing facilities; scientific expertise; and professional military personnel who would know how best to deploy these weapons.

So we believe, as part of the Panel's discussion and recommendation, we need to do a better job of getting the Intelligence Community (the IC) the resources it needs to address the biological threat properly. Frankly, given our assessment of the nature of the threat, we believe that the limited resources are far disproportionate (in a negative way) with regard to the emphasis we need to pay attention, and have the IC pay attention, to biological threats.

Now let me be very clear about something. Even with intelligence on nefarious intent, it takes obviously a very sufficient leap, perhaps, to go from intent to launching a successful attack. A significant amount of knowledge and the institution of some sort of program are necessary for the successful development and execution of a mass casualty attack with a biological weapon. These are fairly large hurdles to jump over, and may explain why we have not seen a large-scale biological attack yet. But our Study Panel, and, frankly, many of the experts who spoke with us and gave us some guidance actually, are concerned that as biological science becomes democratized and increasingly ubiquitous, these hurdles become lower, and frankly they are going to be a lot easier to jump.

Still our weaknesses in the bio-intelligence prevent us from having situational awareness of both our enemy's intent and their capabilities. We intend to work with Congress on the upcoming Intelligence Authorization Bill to realize the kind of improvements the nation needs in supporting IC.

Finally we also expressed a concern reflected in the testimony of many groups and individuals that appeared before us involving the interface between the digital world and the digital threat and the biological threat. Experts told us that the United States is not yet well positioned to address cyber threats that affect the biology and biotechnology sector. We do not know how a cyber attack would affect the life sciences and we are not sure how well pathogens' data are secured. Our Panel recommended that the U.S. government, in partnership clearly with the private sector, move quickly and innovatively to address this growing cybersecurity threat in this sector. We need a national strategy. We must be prepared to commit the resources to it for stored pathogen data. And we need to ensure that we provide the research community with standards, and incentives, and support to secure their data as well.

Although we came up with about 33 recommendations and about a 100 very specific action items to help formalize the biodefense enterprise in this country and to make it to function more efficiently and effectively, there was one major, major recommendation – it may have been at the epicenter of our aspirations in terms of

building a national strategy and response to the potential threat. Let me just say this as an outset: we identified over 50 political appointees who are given some narrow, important, but narrow responsibilities in the whole area of biodefense. And you can well imagine the number of agencies that have as part of their jurisdiction responsibility biodefense. So you have multiplicity of people and agencies. Perhaps you can understand our most basic of recommendations.

Our foremost proposal was that the Vice President of the United States should be the focal point for coordinating the many responsibilities in hearing and running the loose conglomeration of activities and people we call within our government the biodefense enterprise. We need someone at the top who can get the multiple departments—there are a dozen plus departments and agencies – working together, moving simultaneously in the same direction so we can make progress. For us, in many instances, it is a matter of leadership, organization, and implementation. All things we Americans are pretty good at, at all these things, once we bring a focus to it, put somebody in charge to hold others accountable for the mission and to executing on the mission and the strategy that we proposed.

We also made several other recommendations to support the Vice President, including bringing members of both the government and the private sector together to actually build out a strategy upon which these recommendations would be implemented and execute that strategy, again in building the infrastructure we think we need to identify the threat, build the infrastructure internally, to respond and recover if, I do not want to be breathless about it but in the event that either terrorists or Mother Nature throws a contagion at us, particular one that we are not well prepared for, if prepared at all.

I think my friend and colleague Senator Lieberman and I would be very pleased to take your questions once he has had the opportunity to share his thoughts with you as well.

**Senator Joseph I. Lieberman**

*Former United States Senator and Attorney General of the State of Connecticut. Also, the Democratic Vice-Presidential candidate in 2000. Currently, Senior Counsel at Kasowitz, Benson, Torres, & Friedman LLP and Co-Chair of the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense*

My work on this Panel proves that there actually is life after the U.S Senate. It can be a constructive life and working with Tom Ridge, I proved it can be more bipartisan than most anything happening on Capitol Hill today. So a great pleasure to work with Tom.

I just want to add a few points to what Governor Ridge said. He covered it—I mean this was about America's state of preparedness to detect or prevent and respond to a bio threat, whether it be from terrorists or from nature. And it is hard to look at the current state of terrorism in the world, particularly with the coming of the Islamic State (which seems to have built its credibility and its sense of popularity in a small radical group because it went beyond the standards of brutality of even al-Qa'ida that preceded it, particularly with the beheadings). They are working now, as we knew al-Qa'ida was, to develop biological weapons to use against us.

The world presents every day, including this day with the announcement President Obama has made about responding to the Zika virus, the increasing threat of a naturally occurring pathogenic bio threat to the U.S and to people all over the world.

I just want to talk about a few of the conclusions. This is a program about international cooperation, most particularly about international cooperation in dealing with terrorism. But I do want to seize the moment as the Governor did, and talk about international cooperation with regard to naturally occurring bio threats.

One of the things that I had known some about before from my work on homeland security - but really learned a lot more about on the Panel and also learned a new word, which I am embarrassed to say I did not know before – zoonotic. Zoonotic means diseases that reach human beings through animals. We learned a lot about that subject, particularly about what I would call the generally prevalent and totally artificial separation between humans, animals, and the environment, when it comes to biological threats. In fact, among the biological threats for which the U.S Department of Homeland Security has issued a Material Threat Determination, all of them except smallpox are zoonotic. The same is true of emerging infectious diseases, 60% of which enter the human population via animals. I saw an article a while ago that started with a question, "What is the animal or non-human being that has the deadliest effect on the human race?" And you can make a lot of guesses, maybe today because of Zika you will guess what it is. It is the mosquito. This study that I saw said the mosquito can be blamed for 750,000 deaths a year around the globe.

Tom Ridge talked about avian influenza, which devastated parts of the poultry industry in our own Midwest, Northwest and California last year. More than 48 million birds had to be culled and euthanized. That doubled the price of eggs, cost taxpayers nearly \$1 billion, and reminded us that there were no vaccines or treatments available

to prevent the spread of the disease or treat the poultry that had it. But what actually is alarming is how these diseases spread. Avian influenza began in Asia and was carried by migratory waterfowl, who then (in various ways) enable it to spread to poultry. How it got to the United States, or to North America, and to South America are fascinating questions. Some of the theories, believe it or not, are that the migratory birds meet in the Arctic and sometimes the Antarctic and then blend and spread the disease and bring it back to where they were.

This cries out for international cooperation because while it is true that individual countries can limit the spread of disease by applying public health standards in their immigration policies – that is to, at least temporarily, perhaps permanently, stop people from coming in who show signs of the disease – ultimately that is not going to work. Ultimately, no matter what your overall immigration policy is or if you put up a big wall to stop immigrants from coming in, it is not going to stop the waterfowl or the mosquitos who are carrying the disease – and that really calls on us all to really figure out how to cooperate to cut the incidence of these diseases.

I saw a statement by an expert in this a while ago that predicted that sometime in the next two or three decades there would, in fact – unless we managed to come up with better prevention devices and approaches and better major medical countermeasures, that at some point there would – be an infectious disease pandemic. It would make as many as a billion people sick, would kill millions of people, and would cost the world over a trillion dollars, maybe trillions of dollars. So we need international cooperation to work to prevent that, of course, from ever happening.

Let me just focus quickly – and then we will go to questions – on two international organizations that the U.S. and a lot of the countries represented here are a part of. One is the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the so called BWC, which has presented a lot of challenge to all of its signatories. Given the dual-use nature of much of the work done in the life sciences, it is difficult to verify that countries are not doing that work in support of an active biological weapons program as opposed to a more benign and constructive activity, including dealing with the threats that I have just described of naturally occurring infectious diseases. You have got to recognize, as our Panel did, the difficulties inherent in establishing effective verification protocols and America's representatives to the BWC have expressed that clearly. But, just because verification is hard does not mean that we can in any sense disengage from this international process. We have got to keep trying to establish a verification protocol that makes sense and enables all nations of the world to differentiate between legitimate work and that used or being used to develop biological weapons. And that from our point of view means that the United States must stay at the table, engaged with the rest of the world to make progress on this problem.

The second organization is obviously the World Health Organization which has worked hard to maintain awareness of what I called global disease pathogenic surveillance (in other words, which diseases are where) and to alert the world when serious diseases appear and spread. But WHO does not have the resources or capabilities to do it all. We have got a responsibility, our Panel concluded, to lend our resources and expertise in the global disease surveillance endeavor. I understand the

United States has, I know the U.S has, contributed in the past, for instance sending CDC personnel to work at WHO headquarters in Geneva, donating funds to the global outbreak alert and response network, and sharing a lot of the information that we get from our own disease surveillance efforts. I also know that the Obama Administration, fortunately, has placed a high priority on global health security. We have got to maintain and increase those efforts in our own self-interest and self-defense, let alone to protect the rest of the world.

Governor Ridge talked about 33 recommendations, and 100 action items of our report. We do not have time to even begin to describe those but it is online. I urge you to go to that report. I do want to say (on a day when President Obama—and I thank President Obama for announcing the \$1.8 billion to take preventive and responsive action to the Zika Virus—on a day when he announced that) that the finding of our Panel was that the federal government is simply not coordinating the enormous number of efforts in this area of detection and response to bio threats. Therefore, while I am grateful for the statement the President has made, I am also concerned about whether this money will be used in a well-coordinated and most cost-effective way for our government. And that is why, as Tom said, we recommended something unusual, which is that the Office of the Vice President be put in charge of this to give it the power and clout of the White House and also to be able to coordinate what is going on.

Bottom line: bio terrorism and naturally occurring infectious diseases are a clear and present danger in our time that is growing. We concluded that our response to that threat is not growing as fast. We need to pick up the pace and, to go to the topic of today, we will do it best if the nations of the world are working together to meet this challenge, to help all of our citizens.

# Academic Centers

## Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies (IUCTS)

Established in 1994, the activities of IUCTS are guided by an International Research Council that offers recommendations for study on different aspects of terrorism, both conventional and unconventional. IUCTS is cooperating academically with universities and think tanks in over 40 countries, as well as with governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental bodies.

## International Center for Terrorism Studies (ICTS)

Established in 1998 by the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, in Arlington, VA, ICTS administers IUCTS activities and sponsors an internship program in terrorism studies.

## Inter-University Center for Legal Studies (IUCLS)

Established in 1999 and located at the International Law Institute in Washington, D.C., IUCLS conducts seminars and research on legal aspects of terrorism and administers training for law students.

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<i>Prof. Christopher C. Joyner *</i>	<i>Georgetown University</i>	<i>Prof. B. Tusruki</i>		<i>University of Tokyo</i>
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<i>Francisco Jose Paco Llera</i>	<i>Universidad del Pais Vasco</i>	<i>*Deceased</i>		

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Matthew Brenner	University of Maryland	Daniel Marfurt- Levy	George Mason University
Brandon Cordero	University at Albany SUNY	Veeravaroon Mavichak	American University
Caitlin Davis	Duquesne University	Nicholas Norberg	Georgetown University
Patrick Devereux	University of California, Los Angeles	Faith Pollard	University of Mary Washington
Jacob T. Fuller	The University of Oklahoma	Tyler J. Townes	Central Michigan University
Matthew Leger	University at Albany SUNY	Joel Wickwire	University of Oregon School of Law
Ruben Lopez Chavez	University of California, San Diego		

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