

General Principles of Terrorism

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Introduction

This article addresses general principles of terrorism, including definitions, threats, and types of groups as well as radicalization, recruitment, and susceptibility to this form of political violence. Also, terrorist characteristics, porous borders, profiling, creating terrorists, women terrorists, terrorists in the economic system, financing terror, the role of corporate security, public-private partnership in combating terrorism, labor and management challenges to terrorism, emergency management/medical responses to mass casualty terror incidents, and combating terrorism are covered. These topics give the reader an understanding of terrorism and facilitate comprehension of this modern scourge.

Definitions and Statistics

As used in this volume, the term *terrorism* means the unlawful threat or use of violence against civilians and other noncombatants undertaken by individuals, groups, or nations for a political, social, or religious goal. Whatever definition one uses, the typical segments of terrorism are the act (illegal), perpetrators (e.g., individuals, groups, states), objectives (e.g., political, social, ideological), intended outcomes and motivations (e.g., cause fear, create change, force behavioral adjustments), targets (e.g., individuals, government, nongovernment entities, businesses, nonprofits), and modus operandi (e.g., hijackings).¹

The terrorist is effective even when he produces no physical casualties. The menace of force and its psychological impact suffice. Even minimal casualties resulting from an incident can aid the organization's propaganda efforts. Terrorism must be viewed in a strategic context rather than as an irritant. Not grasping this distinction has contributed to its growth. After all, countries have inadequately applied effective policies fully and uniformly.

The US government publishes a list of foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) and state sponsors of terrorism. Over sixty US government-designated FTOs conduct terrorism internationally and threaten US national security. Most FTOs are violent jihadists from the Middle East and Asia. Homegrown violent extremism (HVE) comprises US-based individuals of whatever citizenship who are swayed by an FTO but operate freely of it.

During the Obama administration, twenty-five groups were designated as FTOs, while five FTOs were delisted. Depending on the Trump administration's viewpoints on

Mexican drug trafficking organizations (MDTOs), it is conceivable that proposed measures to label MDTOs as FTOs could be resurrected.² In July 2014, nineteen Republican senators proposed to designate the pro-Russian separatist organizations Donetsk People's Republic and Lugansk People's Republic as FTOs. This effort will not get traction if US-Russian relations improve during the Trump administration.³

However, no statutory domestic terrorism organization (DTO) list exists. Apprehension to establishing a formal DTO would be rife with intense, domestic political considerations as well as constitutional challenges regarding freedom of association and freedom of speech. Still, US government agencies, including the FBI, have labeled particular US extremist groups as terrorist entities, including those associated with radical animal rights and environmental, militia, and sovereign citizen ideologies.

In 2016, the US government listed Iran, Syria, and Sudan as state sponsors of terrorism. Countries formerly specified as state sponsors of terrorism include Cuba (removed during the Obama administration) as well as Libya, Iraq, and North Korea (delisted during the George W. Bush administration). In 2017, the Trump administration designated North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism.

According to the US State Department, there were 11,072 terrorist attacks in 104 countries in 2016. These incidents caused 25,600 deaths, and over 33,800 people were injured. Some 52 percent of the incidents were attributed to 334 terror groups. The perpetrators of the rest of the incidents are unknown.

Despite the global nature of terrorism, "Fifty-five percent of all attacks took place in five countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and the Philippines), and 75% of all deaths due to terrorist attacks took place in five countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Nigeria, and Pakistan)."⁴ In 2016, the number of terror attacks and people killed were 9 percent lower and 13 percent lower, respectively, than in 2015. The terror groups engaged in the most strikes in 2016 were ISIS (1,133), the Taliban (848), Maoists/Communist Party of India (336), al-Shabaab (332), and Houthi extremists (267).

The terms *extremist(s)* and *radical(s)* refer to individuals or groups that adhere to ideologies supporting the threat and/or use of violence for political, religious, or social objectives. For purposes of this book, terrorists, radicals, and extremists will be used interchangeably, although in fact and law, distinctions often exist.

One type of extremism disdains others and uses force (or the threat of force) because of the person's immutable characteristics (e.g., race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, gender, gender identity, or disability). Such bias, as exhibited in criminal acts, is termed a hate crime. Lone wolves, cabals, and those formally linked to a hate group perpetrate such crimes.

Increasingly troublesome are new attempts to inflame a "race war" in the United States. Among some example of such incidents are the October 2016 failed plot by a militia-hate aligned cabal that sought to bomb an apartment complex housing Somali

immigrants in Garden City, Kansas, and Dylann Roof's June 2015 murder of nine parishioners at an African American church in Charleston, South Carolina. White nationalist rallies in Charlottesville, Virginia in 2017, and subsequent efforts in those realms nationally, demonstrate that animosity against the other shows no signs of dissipating for the foreseeable future.

Other prominent hate-based attacks include Omar Mateen's jihadi/anti-LGBTQ attack at a gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida, in June 2016 (at the time, the deadliest mass shooting in US history); Frazier Cross's anti-Semitic attacks at a Jewish community center/old age home in Overland, Kansas, in April 2014; and Wade Page's attack at a Sikh temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin, in August 2012.⁵

In November 2017, the FBI released hate crime statistics for 2016, noting that of "6,121 criminal incidents reported, 6,063 were single-bias incidents (there were also 58 multiple-bias incidents). Of the single-bias incidents:

- 57.5 percent were motivated by a race, ethnicity, or ancestry bias;
- 21.0 percent were motivated by a religious bias;
- 17.7 percent were motivated by a sexual orientation bias;
- The remaining incidents were motivated by a gender identity, disability, or gender bias."⁶

The US Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Statistics estimated that in 2012 there was a 60 percent underreporting of hate crimes. Hate crimes are significantly underestimated owing to victims not notifying police of such incidents. Concurrently, police departments may fail to recognize the role of bias in selected crimes.

A white nationalist resurgence—political and otherwise—may trigger other fringe elements of varying ideologies to threaten or resort to violence. An escalation of hate crimes against minorities (especially blacks, Hispanics, Muslims, and the LGBTQ communities) could produce militancy among portions of society. This is particularly so with anti-fascists movements, including Antifa, who have clashed with white nationalists at rallies and counterdemonstrations in recent years.⁷

Figures from the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) reveal the number of hate groups grew from 676 in 2001 to 926 in 2008 during the George W. Bush presidency. In 2000, the figure was 602. The number of hate groups fell overall during the Obama presidency. During his administration, there was an initial expansion of hate groups from 932 in 2009 to 1,018 in 2011. Those figures dropped to 784 in 2014, prior to reaching 892 groups in 2015. Hate group numbers grew in 2016 and 2017 to 917 and 954, respectively.

Other Extremists

Those who advocate or threaten violence on behalf of single-issue themes (e.g., environmentalism, animal rights, abortion rights) have been deemed domestic extremists.

Individuals and groups aligned with antigovernment movements (e.g., militias, sovereign citizens,⁸ and anarchists) have been classified as American extremists as well.

Environmental and animal rights extremists may speed up their illegal acts if they perceive that the Trump administration buttresses corporate interests over their goals. Trump administration support of oil drilling (e.g., the Dakota Access Pipeline and Alaska's Arctic National Wildlife Refuge) might cause radicals aligned with environmental and indigenous interests to resort to violence. Anarchist militancy could rise due to the election of a billionaire. Yet the Trump administration's anticipated anti-globalist stance may soften such perspectives. It remains to be seen whether pro-life judicial appointments to the US Supreme Court would precipitate violence by those who are pro-choice.

According to SPLC statistics, in 2016 there were 623 antigovernment "patriot" groups. Of that total, 162 of them were identified as militias. The number of antigovernment patriot groups has declined steadily since 2012, when they numbered 1,360, to 998 in 2015.

Threats

The threats that terrorist groups represent worldwide encompass traditional challenges (e.g., bombings, hijackings, kidnappings, hostage taking, assassination) and modern threats such as super terrorism (e.g., biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear) and cyberterrorism. Terrorist threats can be categorized in two principal ways. The first pertains to threats based on the target involved. Terrorists have attacked civilian and military interests; business and infrastructure sites; and government, religious, and civic facilities. The record establishes that no segment of the population is exempt from terrorism. Terrorists do not view any target as off limits. Terrorists even justify killing innocent children in the name of their cause.

A second type of targeting concerns the modus operandi of the attacks. There is widespread use of traditional terrorist operations. Fortunately, terrorists rarely deploy biological or chemical weapons.⁹ Increasingly, cyberterrorism has been used in terms of kinetic attacks as well as for supportive activities. The expanding terror trend includes resorting to suicide bombings, vehicle attacks, stabbings, improvised explosive devices, mass shootings, and simultaneous incidents.

Threats are omnipresent and global. Terror incidents can occur anywhere and at any time. Terrorists have carried out strikes against a myriad of targets by employing several tactics together. While modifications to the modus operandi are inevitable, the trend is toward eye-catching attacks resulting in mass casualties and mayhem.

Concurrently, simple attacks are on the rise, generally undertaken by lone wolves. The relative ease and frequency of uncomplicated incidents (e.g., stabbings and vehicle attacks) may impart greater fear of vulnerability to the population than large-scale strikes. Additionally, lone wolf attacks can be extremely lethal, as illustrated by Anders Breivik

in Norway. In 2011, he killed seventy-seven people in separate bombing and gunfire attacks. Also, in 2016, Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel murdered eight-six people in a truck attack in Nice, France.

Terrorist sympathizers and abettors, individual terrorists, cabals, stand-alone groups, international terrorist networks, and state sponsors of terrorism carry out political violence. Domestic and international groups have attacked national and foreign targets. The deeper the collaboration between terrorist groups and their supporters worldwide, the more lethality they can exact. In turn, the higher the challenge faced by the potential victims of terrorism to prevent such threats. Collaboration between organized crime and terrorist groups further exacerbates the dynamic.

Government, business, and individuals have taken strides to be more cognizant of terror threats. In doing so, they have garnered some successes at home and abroad in combating political violence. But challenges do exist. Also troubling is the fact that each terrorist operation provides a terror group with more information with which to refine its deadly craft.

*Radicalization*¹⁰

The term *radicalization* is the process of embracing an extremist belief system. More specifically, it comprises the inclination to use, support, or facilitate violence as a way to affect political, ideological, religious, or social change. A group's propaganda is disseminated in visual, tactile, audio, and in-person forms with particular fervor to alienated or aggrieved individuals. These persons are more readily responsive to these radical messages than the general population. Terrorist/extremist groups' ideas often contrast with status quo approaches and traditional perceptions of what is right and wrong. A crucial part of this message is the permissibility of using violence to hasten change.

Extremist political goals may include establishing a pan-Islamic state through violence or neo-Nazi precepts of a white, minority-free United States forged through force; expanded gun rights for militias; less government interference inculcated with violence; and banning animals in food, clothing, medical testing, and entertainment. Once ideological goals are framed, group leadership seeks to entice hearts and minds of populations worldwide.

Individuals are radicalized through exposure to terrorist/extremist ideologies in various settings. First, radicalization can arise from the influences of immediate and extended family. In the United States, Don Black, the white nationalist leader of Stormfront.org, exposed his son, Derek Black, to that ideology. Derek served as webmaster of Kids.Stormfront.org. While in college, Derek denounced racism and ceased participation in the website.¹¹

Second, radicalization takes place from exposure at secular and religious educational institutions. Such activities occur in kindergarten through university. This

extremism may transpire through interactions with fellow students, faculty, staff, and student organizations, whatever their ideological bent. Failed December 2009 airplane bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab discovered radical viewpoints while studying at University College London. Similar influences likewise affected Yassin Nassari, a former leader of the Islamic Society at the University of Westminster. Nassari was convicted of attempting to bring missiles into the United Kingdom in 2007. In 2018, these settings, featured globally, continue to be venues where extremists of all ideological spectrums share their ideals with the object of attracting adherents.

Third, radical tenets can permeate places of worship. At such establishments, firebrand clergy and congregants spew their venomous allure. Such exposure can manifest itself in fringe doctrine shared face to face, via audio or video, or in text, in their native tongue or in foreign languages. Instances in which radicalization occurred at religious institutions include al Quds Mosque (Hamburg, Germany), where several 9/11 hijackers met; al Farooq Mosque (Brooklyn), where a few of the 1993 World Trade Center perpetrators interacted; and Finsbury Park Mosque (London), where several of the 2005 London bombers attackers prayed. Abdelbaki Es Satty, the ringleader of attacks in Barcelona and other Spanish cities in 2017, led a mosque in Ripoll.

Particularly significant is cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, a US citizen killed in a 2011 drone strike. Al-Awlaki influenced 2009 Fort Hood shooter Nidal Malik Hasan and 2009 attempted airplane bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, among dozens of other terrorists worldwide. The Hasan-al-Awlaki interactions apparently took place only online. Allegedly, the Abdulmutallab-al-Awlaki discourse occurred face to face.

Extremist precepts are forged through referencing passages from traditional religious dogma. The terror group may misdescribe the nature of the religious text. They may fail to mention its limitation to the historical context in which it was written. Other books mesh radical ideas with operational guidance.

The publications that aided in radicalization of operatives include:

- *Mein Kampf* and *The White Man's Bible* influencing neo-Nazis and World Church of the Creator (Creativity Movement) adherents
- *The Animal Liberation Primer* (Animal Liberation Front and Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty)
- *The Monkey Wrench Gang* (Earth Liberation Front), texts of al Qaeda leaders and their training manuals
- Sayyid Qutb's *Milestones* and the proliferation of Islamic State electronic and printed materials

Fourth, radicalization emerges after protracted interplay with acquaintances. This camaraderie occurs whether people first meet in local, overseas, or online communities. Initial receptivity toward friendship may be shaped by a multitude of commonalities (e.g., racial, ethnic, religious, ideological, socioeconomic, geography, language, employment, education, or otherwise). Gulf War veterans and friends turned 1995 Oklahoma City bombing collaborators Timothy McVeigh, Terry Nichols, and Michael Fortier are three

such examples. So, too, the Fort Dix, New Jersey, plot cabal consisted of family-linked operatives and their friends.

Likewise, radicalization takes hold through exposure to a neighbor's perspectives. Such nearby residents can persuade each other because of their closeness and regularity of contact. Similarly, one's place of employment and colleagues are additional avenues for radicalization. There, too, shared experiences and time spent together magnifies the cohesion. This connection enhances vulnerability to pursuing extremist ideals.

Further exposure to radical ideas happens during interactions with individuals at various activities, including clubs, civic and political organizations. Additional venues where radicalization takes place are sporting events, gun shows, political rallies, youth centers, gymnasiums, and recreational activities such as paintball. The individuals found guilty in relation to the stymied terror plot against the Fort Dix, New Jersey, military base undertook paintball training. This activity enhanced unity among the 2005 London suicide bombers. Similarly, radicalization occurs at youth and summer camps as well as during paramilitary training. These camps are offered in the United States (e.g., militia groups), the Middle East (e.g., Hamas and Hezbollah), and elsewhere.

Globally, prisons have been used to radicalize individuals in extremist philosophies. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the late leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, was radicalized in al Qaeda-related ideologies while serving in a Jordanian prison. Al Qaeda operative and prison mate Rachid Aglif exposed Abdelbaki Es Satty, mentioned above in connection to the 2017 attacks in Spain, to jihadism. So, too, December 2001 shoe bomber Richard Reid and September 2009 Springfield, Illinois, plotter Michael Finton discovered jihadist precepts while in prison in the United Kingdom and United States, respectively. A summer 2005 plot focused on US military and other locations in California. A largely prison-based group, the Assembly of Authentic Islam, sought those targets. Also, in the United States, right-wing hate groups (e.g., neo-Nazis, skinheads, the Ku Klux Klan) proliferate their ideals in prisons in attempts to grow their ranks.

Individuals can be exposed to extremist beliefs of government leaders, political parties, and politicians. Diverse radical perspectives are disseminated worldwide, around the clock, in different languages, and through disparate formal and informal media outlets, including print, radio, cable and satellite television, and online. Terror groups from ISIS and al Qaeda to Hezbollah and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) have their own media outlets through which they circulate their viewpoints and disinformation. To underscore, communication methods (e.g., phone, fax, and internet) enable extremist precepts to be distributed with prospective radicals.

Predicting Susceptibility to Radicalism

According to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), there are risk factors that enhance potential involvement in radicalism. The NCTC also argues that there are protective factors that reduce the prospects of involvement in radicalism. These risk and protective factors transcend individual, family, and community spheres.

The NCTC notes that the following can have an impact on an individual's risk, protective postures, and resilience capabilities:

- Experience of trauma
- Witnessing violence
- Talk of harming self or others
- Committing violent acts toward self or others
- Experiences of loss (loss of home, role, status, loved ones, beliefs)
- Expressions of hopelessness, futility
- Perceived sense of being treated unjustly
- Withdrawal from former activities, relationships
- Connection to group identity (race, nationality, religion, ethnicity)
- Degree of isolation from or connection to others (family, friends, community)
- Vocational or school integration
- General health
- Perceived economic stress¹²

Likewise, a family's risk and protection ratings and resilience capabilities are based on multiple factors, such as:

- Parent-child bonding, empathic connection
- Parental involvement in child's education
- Family members knowing each other's friends
- Family members' awareness of one another's activities
- Presence of emotional or verbal conflict in family
- Family members' violent or physically abusive attitudes toward one another
- Family members' trust in one another
- Family connection to identity group (race, nationality, religion, ethnicity)
- Perceived economic stress
- Family involvement in community cultural and religious activities¹³

Lastly, the NCTC denotes that a community's risk and protection ratings and resilience traits are:

- Trust in institutions and law enforcement
- Isolation and social exclusion, degree of insularity
- Discrimination
- Neighborhood safety
- Access to health care
- Access to social services
- Access to educational resources
- Access to recreational resources
- Degree of violence in community
- Presence of ideologues or recruiters

- Availability of self-help networks
- Cohesiveness among community members¹⁴

Many factors contribute to the susceptibility of individuals, families, and communities to engaging in terrorism. Similarly, multiple elements affect protective features that lessen engagement in violent extremism.

Radicalization and Family Affiliated Terrorism

Family affiliated terrorism requires one household member to enter the terrorism fold. There is no kin-connected terrorism to address absent that criterion. An example of initial kin becoming radical is Siddhartha Dhar. He is a British-born father of four who took his wife and children to join the Islamic State. His incipient exposure to extremism arose through a childhood friend. The companion was a follower of radical Islamic preachers Omar Bakri Mohammed and Anjem Choudary. Dhar was exposed to their radical precepts through this acquaintance.

By 2006, Dhar was convicted of soliciting the murder of British soldiers. In September 2014, Dhar was arrested with Choudary for supporting the outlawed Islamist group al-Muhajiroun and encouraging terrorism. By late 2014, Dhar had taken his wife, Aisha, and kids to Syria. There, he joined ISIS. In January 2016, Dhar apparently narrated an ISIS propaganda video involving five hostages. In January 2018, the US State Department designated Dhar as a Specially Designated Global Terrorism. As of that date, he is believed to be in Syria.

A terror incident arising from early exposure to radicalism was marked with a February 2016 stabbing of a police officer at a Hanover, Germany, train station. The perpetrator, a fifteen-year-old girl Safia S., conducted the attack after she was asked to provide identity papers after appearing to be suspicious. Investigations determined that Safia was of German and Moroccan descent. She was in contact with Islamic State operatives in Turkey. The ISIS members had explained to her how to carry out a knife attack.

The previous month, Safia had traveled to Turkey, intending to make her way to Syria. Her mother brought her back from Turkey to Germany. Prior to Safia's travel to Turkey, her brother went there with the hope of later reaching Syria and joining the Islamic State. Safia was also in contact with a Syrian-German, Mohamad Hasan K., who was later arrested for having knowledge of her prospective attack plans.

Before Safia's trip to Turkey, her grandmother had contacted German authorities, expressing concern about her granddaughter's radicalization. Yet it appears that Safia's parents contributed to their daughter's embrace of radicalism. After all, at age eight, Safia had appeared in propaganda videos of Salafist preacher Pierre Vogel. Her participation in the video suggests that her parents supported Salafist teachings.¹⁵

The radicalization and enlistment of the first family member may arise in person, online, or both. These external forces may occur at multiple locations. Among such instances of note are educational and religious institutions; through friends, neighbors, or coworkers; and by plenty of online instrumentalities, such as social networks (Facebook), microblogging (Twitter), and video sharing (YouTube).

A family member, such as a parent, may expose a child to an extremist ideology and pursue it with vigor. At first, the child may become enamored with this viewpoint. Later, the child may reject that ideology and pursue a different radical tenet. Alternatively, the child may abandon extremism.

Future terrorists may be enticed in their youth. These phases may be spurred from within or outside the family. In 2003, Moroccan sisters Imane and Sanne al Ghariss planned to launch simultaneous suicide bombings in Rabat. The siblings were prevented from reaching their goal owing to their later arrest. Similarly, 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and his brother Salem were radicalized in their youth.

A parent's sway over their children to engage in terrorism is considerable. For instance, Samantha Lewthwaite is the widow of London 2005 suicide bomber Germaine Lindsey. She later married British terror operative Habib Saleh Ghani. Al-Shabaab killed Ghani after a dispute with the group. Lewthwaite said she was proud that her eight-year-old boy and five-year-old daughter wanted to be holy warriors (mujahedeen).

In January 2015, brothers Cherif and Said Kouachi attacked the office of *Charlie Hebdo* magazine in Paris. A radical cleric, Farid Benyettou, exposed the siblings to violent jihad. Afterward, Cherif served time in prison with Benyettou for conspiracy to conduct terrorism. While in prison, Cherif met Amedy Coulibaly, who was in prison for armed burglaries. Coulibaly's onslaught at a Paris kosher supermarket was coordinated with the Kouachi brothers' *Charlie Hebdo* strike.

In 2009, Said traveled to Yemen, where he met future failed underwear bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. In 2011, Said and Cherif went to Yemen. There, the siblings obtained terror training from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. During that trip, Cherif purportedly received \$20,000 to conduct an expected strike in France.

Before its territorial demise, more than 40,000 persons from over one hundred countries traveled to the Islamic State. Particularly abhorrent among those were parents taking their children to Syria and Iraq. For instance, Sally Jones, a forty-five-year-old, mother-of-two from Chatham, Kent, in the United Kingdom, and former punk rocker, married Junaid Hussain, a twenty-year-old computer hacker from Birmingham. In 2013, Jones, her son (Jo Jo) from a previous marriage, and Hussain traveled to Syria so they could reside in the Islamic State. Hussain, who was linked to many international terror plots, was killed in a coalition air strike in Syria in 2015.

By 2016, JoJo, now called Abu Abdullah al-Britani, appeared in an Islamic State video in which he executed a man in Raqqa, Syria. But for Sally Jones bringing her son

to Syria, the youngster would not have become an executioner for a terrorist group. The mother's decision to allow her child to join ISIS could be portrayed as a war crime. After all, international law prohibits the recruitment and use of children soldiers. Additionally, Jones denounced the United States and United Kingdom as terrorist nations and managed multiple social media accounts in an effort to recruit individuals to ISIS. In June 2017, Jones was killed in a U.S. drone strike along Syrian-Iraq border. That same year, it was reported that Jo Jo was killed.¹⁶

In May 2013, Hysen Sherifi was sentenced to life in prison for conspiring to hire a hit man to behead FBI agents and witnesses who testified in his earlier terror trial. Hysen recruited his brother, Shkumbin, and a woman, Nevine Aly Elshiekh, to arrange the murder-for-hire plot. Later, Hysen was convicted of a terror conspiracy involving the Boyd family cabal.

In April 2005, Eric Rudolph pleaded guilty to the following:

- The 1996 Olympics bombing in Atlanta, Georgia, which killed two persons and injured 111 others;
- The 1997 bombing of an abortion in Sandy Springs, Georgia, which injured seven people;
- The 1997 bombing of a lesbian nightclub in Atlanta, which injured five people; and
- The 1998 bombing of an abortion clinic in Birmingham, Alabama, which killed one person and injured another.

Rudolph was a Christian Identity movement follower. Additionally, he supported violent antiabortion and antigay activities. The Army of God group claimed Rudolph's attacks were undertaken on its behalf. Interestingly, Rudolph's mother, Pat, said of her son, "His anger, his way of dealing with this cause, is not mine; it's his. Therefore, the responsibility is his."¹⁷ Yet Rudolph's perspectives did not arise in a vacuum. Pat took Eric and his younger brother to a Christian Identity compound in Missouri for several months before returning to North Carolina.

Terror Characteristics

Terrorists target hard and soft targets alike. Among such incidents are simultaneous assaults using alternative forms of attack (e.g., gunfire, suicide bombings, stabbings, hostage taking, kidnappings) against destinations (e.g., transportation, hotels, religious institutions).

Although underappreciated, some perpetrators of terror have engaged in traditional crime. This entrance into criminality serves as a gateway to ideologically inspired illicit acts. The 2016 Berlin truck attacker, Anis Amri, killed twelve people. Prior to that incident, he was involved in cocaine trafficking in Germany. Additionally, Amri served time in an Italian prison for arson.¹⁸

Brothers Khalid and Ibrahim el Bakraoui conducted suicide bombings in Brussels in March 2016. Similarly, siblings Brahim and Salah Abdeslam participated in the November 2015 Paris attacks. Both sets of kin delved into a range of traditional crimes (e.g., robbery, carjacking, drug trade) prior to their involvement with terrorism.

Terrorists leverage free, encrypted communications technologies to communicate and facilitate terrorist activities. Amri interacted with his ISIS interlocutors using Telegram. In one Telegram exchange, he pledged allegiance to the group.

Criminals and terrorists take advantage of pliable and sympathetic immigration laws of host countries. In light of expanded terror attacks worldwide featuring foreign-inspired ideologies, the accommodating posture of recipient nations is bound to be limited. In fact, the appeal of anti-immigrant political parties is increasing across Europe. This backlash is a response to Europe's admission of millions of refugees from the Middle East since 2011.

The knowledge base for making homemade explosives is widespread, growing, and available online in multiple languages. The homemade explosive triacetone triperoxide (TATP) was used in the December 2015 Paris and March 2016 Brussels attacks. Additionally, a terrorist chose that explosive in a stymied suicide bombing at a Berlin airport in 2016. Even terrorists based in the United States have built bombs ranging from pressure cooker bombs to improvised explosive devices using TATP.

Terrorists may have multiple identities, including various nationalities. Amri was found to have six fake cards using three different nationalities.¹⁹ Amri and Lahouaiej-Bouhlel were not part of the (returning) Islamic State foreign fighters. It is expected that returning foreign fighters will undertake large-scale strikes in their home countries or elsewhere. For illustration, the perpetrators of the November 2015 Paris attacks included former French and Belgian residents who had returned from fighting in Syria.

Terror networks benefit from trust ties (e.g., family, friendship, religious and educational institutions) and operational ties (e.g., communications, logistics, organizational, financing, and training). These connections enhance cohesiveness of the cell, contributing to its strength and continuity. Yet such links may undermine the terror cell. After all, the more persons involved in a cell, the greater the chance of its discovery by authorities.

Terrorists Are Created, Not Born²⁰

Political oppression, economic dysfunction, corruption, and other elements of failing states contribute to the rise in the number of economic and political refugees worldwide. Some refugees do not integrate well into their host countries. Less regularly, the settlers turn against their destination country.

Amri left Tunisia and sought resettlement in Italy. He spent time there in a refugee center. After time in Italian prisons, Amri went to Germany, where he conducted

his terror attack. From the site of that carnage, Amri escaped through several European countries before returning to Italy. In Italy, he was killed during an encounter with police.

European prisons, as others in the Middle East and North America, serve in part as incubators for extremism, whether violent jihadist or otherwise. According to Amri's brother, Abdelkader, Amri was radicalized while serving a prison sentence for arson in Italy.

Likewise, persons may enter as refugees. Then they may become involved in traditional criminality. After imprisonment, they may turn into extremists. Upon discharge from prison, the neophyte extremist seeks like-minded radicals, who reinforce his decision to follow such principles. After choosing to launch an attack, the individual proceeds with his action—either alone or in a cabal. Amri was part of the Islamic State-linked network led by an Iraqi national, Ahmad Abdulaziz Abdullah (Abu Walaa), who was arrested in Germany with others in November 2016.

Porous Borders, Refugees, and Uncooperative Countries

Porous borders arise from poor monitoring and legislation permitting unimpeded travel. For instance, Europe adopted the decades-long Schengen Agreement, which largely limits border controls. Weak borders facilitate criminals' and terrorists' easy access to prospective targets. As noted, Amri took full advantage of this situation, both upon his first arrival to Italy and in visits to other nations.

Italian authorities sought in vain to send Amri to Tunisia, but that nation rebuffed the request on multiple occasions. Tunisia questioned whether Amri was Tunisian. A host country faces obstacles during attempts to return suspected terrorist refugees to their countries of origin.

Profiling

Challenges exist with “profiling” prospective terrorists. It is foolhardy to believe that just because an individual is of a particular race, religion, ethnicity, national origin, gender, or other immutable essence, that individual will be a terrorist. But depending on the ideology of an extremist or terror group, there will be a strong—if not exclusive—representation of members from a certain race, ethnicity, or religion.

In contrast, other extremist or terrorist groups may relate to an ideology that does not factor immutable characteristics. For instance, sovereign citizens embrace a variety of anti-government ideologies, none that have a nexus with immutable characteristics. Most sovereign citizens are white males. Yet nonwhites, such as those identifying as Moors, also comprise sovereign citizen members. Likewise, single-issue extremists—animal rights activists, environmentalists, and anti-abortionists—tend not to come from an exclusive race, religion, national origin, or gender.

In attempting to uncover prospective terrorist actors, it is important to take heed of the US Department of Justice's December 2014 "Guidance for Federal Law Enforcement on 'Profiling,'" which provides:

- Two standards in combination should guide use by Federal law enforcement officers of race, ethnicity, gender, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity in law enforcement or intelligence activities:
- In making routine or spontaneous law enforcement decisions, such as ordinary traffic stops, Federal law enforcement officers may not use race, ethnicity, gender, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity to any degree, except that officers may rely on the listed characteristics in a specific suspect description. This prohibition applies even where the use of a listed characteristic might otherwise be lawful.
- In conducting all activities other than routine or spontaneous law enforcement activities, Federal law enforcement officers may consider race, ethnicity, gender, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity only to the extent that there is trustworthy information, relevant to the locality or time frame, that links persons possessing a particular listed characteristic to an identified criminal incident, scheme, or organization, a threat to national or homeland security, a violation of Federal immigration law, or an authorized intelligence activity. In order to rely on a listed characteristic, law enforcement officers must also reasonably believe that the law enforcement, security, or intelligence activity to be undertaken is merited under the totality of the circumstances, such as any temporal exigency and the nature of any potential harm to be averted. This standard applies even where the use of a listed characteristic might otherwise be lawful.²¹

Women Terrorists²²

Women of all ages and marital statuses, including mothers, have taken part in terrorist operations. Female terrorists have run the spectrum of socioeconomic backgrounds from poor to middle class and uneducated to university graduates. Like men, women terrorists pursue such violence resulting from diverse elements: perceived political and economic marginalization, ideological commitment, avenging victimization of family or friends, financial benefits, a desire to improve their social status, hopelessness, and heavenly benefits arising from martyrdom. Some women have been coerced into terrorism after they have been accused of bringing dishonor to their kin through some moral infraction.

Women terrorists have been involved in a range of violent actions on behalf of groups having all ideological perspectives. Female terrorists have inflicted damage on

soft and hard targets, usually enjoying laxer attitudes from government, private security, and the public, since women are typically not perceived to be involved with terrorism. This misconception is a factor in the success of female terrorists in perpetrating many attacks, including suicide bombings.

Including females as terrorists doubles the number of prospective recruits and contributors to a terrorist cause. Also, women are viewed with less suspicion than men. Women offer tactical advantages, including less frequent and rigorous searches by government authorities. Law enforcement, security personnel, and the intelligence community at home and abroad have assumed that women will refrain from terrorist activities. But these attitudes are changing with more frequent investigations and prosecutions of women terrorists in the United States and abroad.

Given the heightened visibility, lethality, and contributions of female terrorists worldwide, this underestimation of women terrorists merits urgent recalibration. The role of women in family terror networks should be considered as well.²³

Those seeking a relationship and ultimately marriage can be enticed by a terrorist suitor. This happened with Shannon Conley, a Colorado teenager who was radicalized by jihadist propaganda and longed to travel to join the Islamic State. Concurrently, while online, Shannon interacted with a Syria-based Tunisian operative thirteen years her senior. He purportedly promised to marry her and help her engage in jihad in Syria.

Shannon joined the US Army Explorers, a career program provided under the umbrella of the Boy Scouts of America. The program provides training in armed combat, military tactics, and firearms. Shannon planned to exploit these techniques and wage jihad abroad. In case she could not fight, she promised to help the jihadi fighters while serving as a nurse.

In 2014, Shannon was caught boarding a flight from Denver to Turkey, with eventual plans to join the group in Syria. The following year, she pleaded guilty to conspiracy to provide material support to the Islamic State. She was sentenced to four years in prison.

Those who knew Shannon described her transformation as stemming from being a “bright teenager lost in middle-class suburbia,”²⁴ searching for meaning and a mate. Following her arrest, authorities claim they found CDs by US-born radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki among her belongings. On her Facebook page, Shannon referred to herself as Halima. She described her work as “a slave to Allah.”²⁵ Shannon told the FBI she was sought to defend Muslims against their oppressors.

The Islamic State actively seeks to radicalize and recruit women and girls online or otherwise²⁶ by disseminating the following narrative:

- Leave the decadence and apostasy of your home country, where you are deemed undesirable.

- Join the jihad and be empowered by living in a true Muslim land (the caliphate).
- You will contribute to the cause by marrying an ISIS fighter and parenting the next generation of warriors.

Interspersed in the ISIS pitch is the notion that a caliphate-based life will be exciting and meaningful. An ISIS-based life, the pitch continues, is better than what life in their home country affords.

Aisha Kadad, a Syrian woman whose first husband was killed in Homs in 2012, regretted moving to Raqqa to live in the caliphate. There, she married an ISIS fighter. Following the defeat of ISIS in Mosul and beyond, in summer 2017, Kadad and other ISIS widows claimed they were unaware of the spouses' roles in ISIS. Alternatively, the widows proffered that their husbands' participation in the group was marginal. Kadad claimed life under IS was "hell," and she regretted going to Raqqa. Such newly found widows had traveled to Syria with their husbands or found spouses there.²⁷

Many children of ISIS fighters are in a precarious situation if one or both of their parents have been killed or are missing. In July 2017, Iraqi soldiers found children, including toddlers, in Mosul and elsewhere who were believed to be orphans. In one instance, a Russian-speaking toddler claimed both parents had been "martyred."²⁸

A policy challenge exists as to how to rehabilitate the thousands of ISIS widows and their children based in Syria and elsewhere. Determining whether such individuals still hold pro-ISIS views is a daunting challenge. For some, their allegiance to the movement will not dissipate. Their zeal for jihad continues after resettling in the West or another region. Also, discerning which individuals holding such perspectives would become terrorists is not facile.

The physical and mental harm these children suffered in the caliphate and later war zones could make reintegrating them into civil society difficult. Such youngsters might be "irredeemable" from the throngs of their troubled past.

Aqsa Mahmood established a Tumblr blog, *Diary of a Muhajirah*.²⁹ In it, she discussed her life as a female member of ISIS. She was born in Glasgow, Scotland, to a successful Pakistani immigrant businessman and his wife. Aqsa was educated in a top private school in the city, Craigholme School. Friends remember her as being a Westernized girl. She later became more interested in Islam and wore a hijab. Similarly, Aqsa bought religious books, followed classes on Islam, and chatted about Islamist ideology with people over the internet.

Aqsa attended Shawlands Academy, a secondary school. Then she took a course in diagnostic radiography at Glasgow Caledonian University. She left her studies in 2013. Afterward, she reached Syria. Once there, she joined ISIS and wed an ISIS fighter. Aqsa tweeted messages calling on others to repeat the murder of soldier Lee Rigby; the massacre at Fort Hood, the US army base in Texas; and the Boston Marathon bombing.

She is believed to be a leader of the Khansaa Battalion, an ISIS female enforcer group. In August 2017, Aqsa was stripped of her UK citizenship, preventing her return.

The roles of widows and other females in the terrorism context merit further scrutiny. These survivors may undertake terror operations to avenge the deaths of their fallen kin, usually husbands and brothers. Likewise, widows in this predicament may marry again to individuals with extremist ideologies and follow their paths. Ultimately, the aggrieved spouse can support or engage in operational activities.

As mentioned earlier, terrorists who become martyrs for their cause are sometimes emulated by current and subsequent generations in that same family, such as black widows. Dozens of Chechen black widows have committed martyr terror attacks to avenge the deaths of their husbands. Often, Russian (or Russian-aligned) forces killed their husbands during the Russian-Chechen/Dagestan conflicts. Among such widows was Luiza Gazuyeva. Gazuyeva detonated hand grenades hidden under her clothes in November 2001 in Chechnya. Her attack killed Russian General Gaidar Gadzhiyev. Gazuyeva claimed the general assassinated her husband and other family members.

Aminat Kurbanova, an ethnic Russian and former actress/dancer, converted to Islam after her second marriage to a man involved in the Dagestan jihadist insurgency, who was killed by Russian authorities in 2009. Another of Kurbanova's late husbands, Magomed Ilyasov, was killed while mishandling a bomb. Before his death, Ilyasov provided terror training to another couple, Vitaly Razdobudko and his wife, who became suicide bombers. Kurbanova conducted a suicide bombing at the home of a leading Sufi cleric in Dagestan, Said Afandial-Chirkawi.

Other illustrations of such violence include the suicide bombings at two Moscow metro stations in March 2010 by two widows from Dagestan, resulting in thirty-nine deaths. The first was Dzhennet Abdurakhmanova, whose Dagestani jihadist husband, Umalat Magomedov. In 2009, Russian forces killed him. She hit one of the transportation targets. The second, female perpetrator is unidentified.³⁰

Besides killing their targets with suicide bomb belts and grenades, black widows have used explosives-laden vehicles. Such was the case of the first black widows incident in June 2000, when Luiza Magomadova and Khava Barayeva exploded a truck at a building, killing Russian forces in Chechnya. Barayeva's uncle was a Chechen militant who was killed by the Russian military in 1999.³¹

Terror group members and their supporters idolize women who have launched "martyr" operations on behalf of their organizations. This is so for children who seek to imitate female terrorists as well. Hamas member Reem Riyashi, twenty-two-year-old mother of two from Gaza, blew herself up in a joint Israel-Palestinian industrial zone in January 2004, murdering four Israelis. Palestinian Authority-run Al-Aqsa TV showed music videos in which Riyashi's four-year-old daughter said she craved to follow in her mom's footsteps. In 1996, Wafa Idris carried out the first female Palestinian suicide bombing.

Also, women have conducted suicide attacks to avenge the deaths of their militant family members. In June 2003, Hanadi Jaradat, a twenty-nine-year-old Palestinian lawyer, conducted a suicide bombing at a restaurant in Haifa, Israel. Jaradat killed more than twenty people and injured over fifty. She carried out the strike on behalf of Palestinian Islamic Jihad to avenge the deaths of her brother (Fadi) and cousin (Salah).

Sarah H., one of three women arrested in relation to a September 2016 plot to detonate explosives near Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris, was engaged to two different French ISIS members (Larossi Abballa and Adel Kermiche). However, police killed these prospective husbands after two different terror incidents in France during summer 2016.

*Terrorists in the Economic System*³²

Terrorists and their supporters take advantage of opportunities and loopholes within the economic system to further their murderous goals. Leveraging the fruits of the economic system enables terrorists to get financial, organizational, and operational help (e.g., arms, training, intelligence, and information). Terrorists and their abettors use existing traditional frameworks such as companies and nonprofit entities to raise funds, receive support, and integrate themselves into the community. Traditional and nontraditional financial systems present in the economic systems are used as well.

Perpetrators of political violence also launch a variety of criminal activities (e.g., counterfeiting currency, credit cards, and ATM cards; misappropriating and using credit card information; forging documents; identity theft; money laundering; drug trafficking; corruption; commercial espionage; general criminal activities) in violation of permissible norms in an economic framework. Additionally, some terrorists are involved in the black market: antiquity plundering and trafficking, tobacco smuggling, and machinery/equipment transactions.

Terrorists will act within domestic and international economic systems to obtain financial resources, weaponry, products, services, information, and tools that can be used against government, industry, and other segments of society. Terrorists contact product and service providers openly, secretly, and through abettors. Unsuspecting companies and individuals may provide terrorists wares for their operations. Given an enhanced awareness of such possibilities, industry is better attuned to reducing complicity with terror groups. Companies will investigate future employees, clients, and partners to lessen the chance that malfeasance occurs.

Yet the desire for profits has induced firms to close their eyes to shady deals. Alternatively, firms establish foreign subsidiaries to undertake “dirty deals” with terrorists, their sympathizers, or even state sponsors of terrorism. Unfortunately, avarice at selected companies makes such negative corporate conduct likely to continue. Expanded enforcement and modification of government sanctions, in combination with

pressure from investors in such public companies, should help weaken another source of terror wares and funding.

Financing Terror³³

Terrorist groups use an array of means—from simple to complex—to secure funds for their activities. Terror funds are derived from both legal sources (e.g., personal savings, donations, legitimate business revenue) and illegal ones (e.g., criminal acts such as drug-trafficking and financial fraud). Monies raised are distributed to terrorist groups through diverse techniques.

The tools that terrorist organizations use to fund their deadly activities include traditional and alternative financial services (e.g., banks and hawalas), charities, trading in commodities (e.g., “conflict” diamonds and gold), drug trafficking, extortion, money laundering, smuggling, securities fraud, and scams. The costs of launching terrorist attacks range from a few dollars to hundreds of thousands of dollars or more. Terrorism is sometimes referred to as “warfare on the cheap.” Depending on the size and complexity of the operation, the sophistication of weaponry, and the training, the costs can vary. The 9/11 incidents are estimated to have cost about \$500,000 to put together. But the attacks resulted in direct and indirect economic costs in the hundreds of billions of dollars.

The price of terror attacks increases if one includes the costs of maintaining a hierarchical terror group. The costs of operating terrorist groups range from thousands of dollars to millions of dollars if one includes funds for training, housing and general assistance, weaponry, human capital, and operational support. Money is the lifeblood of terrorism. Companies, foundations, and individuals who aid both subnational and state-actor terrorists in carrying out their criminal actions are a serious problem.

Steps to thwart terrorists from securing funds are essential in grappling with the challenge. When their funding capabilities are undermined, terrorist organizations are harmed. Therefore, it is less likely that their deadly operations will arise. If they do occur, the attacks will be less effectual than they might have been.

The Role of Corporate Security³⁴

Terrorism is easy and inexpensive to activate yet very difficult and costly to counter. Business, too, is cognizant that it has limited financial means with which to curtail terrorist risks. The challenge of providing enough security without spending excessive resources has reached greater resonance. Corporations’ recognition of terror dangers has compelled them to devote considerable resources to security. The time, manpower, and funding spent addressing security measures vary depending on the company’s industry, size, geography, international activities, and symbolic value, as well as the probability and ease of its being targeted.

Whether industry has the products and services available to undertake preventative or corrective steps, along with the costs associated with such measures, are also relevant issues. For instance, one can consider the costs and implementation of

antimissile technology on commercial jets to counter terrorists' use of shoulder-fired missiles.

Industry's security efforts are likewise influenced by whether government and/or industry mandates exist. If so, what types of accompanying sanctions attach should a firm fail to abide by government and/or industry security guidelines? A complicating security issue is that some employees do not follow company-posted security measures and contribute to weaker defenses.

The financial implications of improved security procedures are worth assessing. For example, the matter of who bears the costs of such measures is significant to whether anything is done to implement security. Analogously, should costs be designated as "security charges" (e.g., airline security fees) or subsumed within the rising prices of products and services without attribution? Businesses deemed soft terror targets (e.g., restaurants, movie theaters) might impose security charges.

Security is expected to perform a more prominent role at companies as terror threats remain. Well-known international companies exemplifying Western economic power (e.g., banking, energy, technology) will likely be targeted. Also, firms that attract many people in a concentrated area (e.g., buses, subways, train stations, stores, restaurants) are prone to being victimized. Security procedures at prospective targets will cause multidimensional responses. Using political risk analysis, traditional security products and services, risk management tools, and business continuity/disaster planning should be considered to lower the peril of terrorism. Concurrently, such steps protect company assets.

Intelligence gathering and analysis are vital pieces of effective security practices within both government and industry contexts. Additionally, the military and law enforcement are indispensable to the security paradigm.

A corporation's aim is to be profitable. One would suppose any allocation of resources that directly or indirectly undermines profitability should be avoided. In reality, counterterror measures may likewise aid firms in protecting data, preventing sabotage, and decreasing theft of company assets. Political violence can destroy a company's operations. Still, management must balance spending on counterterror efforts with safeguarding a company's scarce funds. The prospects of terror attacks enable executives to justify large disbursements on security. When the time comes that terror threats have waned (or are perceived to have done so), companies will examine once again the utility of security expenditures.

Additionally, since 9/11, the majority of US multinational companies have taken a serious approach to the terrorist threat, particularly when their employees travel internationally and visit soft-target countries. Most corporations provide risk assessments of countries visited by employees and/or where expatriates live for two-year stints. Major concerns are kidnappings and express kidnappings (taking money from the ATMs of those employees who have been abducted).

Also, US corporations are partnering with US Customs and Border Protection with their Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) programs. C-TPAT involves screening and supply-chain management of containers coming from overseas for possible weapons of mass destruction inside. Analogously, the Department of Homeland Security developed a program, the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS), that collaborates with chemical “facilities to ensure they have security measures in place to reduce the risks associated with certain hazardous chemicals and prevent them from being exploited in a terrorist attack.”³⁵

Public-Private Partnership in Combating Terrorism³⁶

The interactions and support between government and industry in combating terrorism are manifested in several ways: government aiding business, industry assisting the public sector, and discord between the two. The government buys homeland security wares from companies. Through the privatization of government duties, industry gains access to opportunities that it otherwise would not possess. Government allocates moneys to companies—directly and indirectly—prior to and in the wake of terror attacks. The government may enact laws limiting firms’ potential liabilities in case of a terror attack.

The public sector lends its personnel and expertise to companies before, during, and after a terror incident. These efforts try to decrease harm to a company’s assets, including the well-being of its employees.

Government guides industry on terror threats and responses. The public sector aids industry by establishing rules facilitating ways to conduct business. Industry is afforded formal and informal means of communication with government officials. These exchanges enable companies to learn about new security demands and business opportunities.

The government-industry dynamic also has its difficulties. Tensions include developments in the federalization of counterterror roles juxtaposed with the privatization of government duties. Whether government or industry oversteps its bounds by entering into the purview of the other is an example of such tension. Government legislation affecting security at companies, rules affecting how business is conducted, and the transformation of government institutions have caused friction between the private and public sectors.

Labor and Management Challenges³⁷

Labor and management are potential terror victims. Due to terrorism, management faces new responsibilities and risks connected with its employees. Workers are pursuing opportunities arising from counterterror activities while also being victimized due to the expansion of global terrorism. Additionally, multiple shifts in the labor market are propelled by the war on terrorism.

Terrorist incidents can damage both workers and managers. A terrorist's bomb does not distinguish between labor and management. A catastrophic terrorist incident can cause the death of thousands of employees in one industry, such as occurred with finance-sector employees on September 11. Worldwide, suicide bombers targeting mass transit or restaurants have previously killed or injured thousands within these sectors. A strike at a nuclear facility or port could severely victimize another segment of workers.

Employees can survive terror attacks by not being at work on the day of the attack due to sickness, a meeting outside the office, or travel plans. Others are not so fortunate—including workers who survived the 1993 World Trade Center attack, but not the 9/11 incidents. Fate or chance also plays a role in the potential victimization of labor.

Parts of the labor market are less vulnerable to certain types of terrorist attacks. For instance, executives flying on corporate jets meet reduced risk of hijacking. Yet senior personnel are more vulnerable to kidnapping or assassination by terrorist groups than entry-level employees.

Workers with security and business-continuity expertise are integral parts of a management team. This is especially so when a serious attack undermines corporate assets. Analogously, any incapacity or death of corporate security employees would undermine a firm's recovery and continuity.

Police, firefighters, and emergency medical technicians play critical roles during and after a terrorist attack. So, too, should private sector employees be regarded as part of the solution. After all, they make gas masks, germ detection devices, and pharmaceuticals. Defense contractors and their employees offer the government diverse products and services instrumental in combating terrorism.

Additionally, the labor market includes persons who collaborate with or support terrorists by supplying funds arising from legitimate and illegal businesses, conducting business with front organizations, or providing products and services used by terrorists. Terrorists may become employed in sectors targeted for a future terrorist attack (e.g., chemical or water treatment plants). Similarly, they may obtain roles that will not attract too much attention (e.g., "students" working at a university library or restaurant).

In this post-September 11 era, labor expects employers to play a new security-related function besides providing a job and wage. Labor envisions that employers should play a semi-paternalistic/quasi-governmental function: provide physical security, emotional assistance, and guidance in times of turmoil. For their part, executives must balance the desire to protect their workforce with conducting business under increasingly complex market conditions (e.g., rising direct and indirect costs due to terrorism).

*Emergency Response Planning for Mass Casualty Terror Attacks*³⁸

Lessons have been learned from selected mass casualty terror attacks in Western Europe (Nice, Paris, Brussels, and Oslo) and the United States (Orlando, San Bernardino,

and Boston). In particular, this section of the book touches on these terror incidents and addresses their consequences for emergency management and medical response planning.

Background

Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel plowed a truck through pedestrians viewing fireworks on Bastille Day 2016 in Nice. The attack caused eight-six fatalities and over four hundred injuries. All but one of those who perished did so within hours of the incident. Ten children and teenagers were killed in the attack. Police killed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel as he left the truck and shot at them.³⁹

The March 2016 attacks in Brussels comprised three suicide bombings: two at an airport and another at a subway station an hour later. The attackers—brothers Ibrahim and Khalid el Bakraoui and Najim Laachraoui—killed thirty-five persons and injured three hundred others. Given the modus operandi, the three suicide bombers were killed instantly. Another explosive device was discovered by police at the airport and detonated safely.⁴⁰

The November 2015 Paris attacks involved operatives separated into teams equipped with assault rifles and suicide bomb vests. The perpetrators attacked assorted targets including a sports stadium, a concert hall, a bar, cafés, and restaurants, utilizing both modalities. The incidents resulted in 130 persons killed and injuries to over 360 others. Eight terror operatives were killed during the course of the incidents. Others involved in the plot were later killed in a standoff with police, were arrested, or escaped. The Islamic State/ISIS directed the Paris and Brussels incidents. The Nice attack appears to have been inspired by the group.

In July 2011, Anders Breivik undertook the deadliest attack in Norway since World War II. In Oslo, Breivik detonated a bomb at a government building, killing eight people and injuring more than ninety others. Later that day, he conducted a mass shooting at a Labor Party's Workers Youth League event on an island near Oslo. That onslaught resulted in sixty-nine deaths and over sixty injuries.

After a delayed response by Norwegian police, Breivik surrendered to authorities at his second target. In August 2012, he was convicted of mass murder and other related crimes. Breivik was sentenced to twenty-one years in prison, the maximum under Norwegian law. He appears to have embraced white nationalist and neo-Nazi ideologies, accompanied by anti-Muslim precepts.

In June 2016, the deadliest mass shooting terrorist incident in US history took place in Orlando. A lone gunman, Omar Mateen, attacked patrons at a gay nightclub with a semiautomatic rifle and handgun. The resulting carnage was forty-nine deaths and fifty-three injuries. Mateen was shot and killed during a shootout with police following extended hostage negotiations.

The November 2015 San Bernardino attackers, Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik, shot and killed fourteen and injured twenty-two others at a government office. The couple used semiautomatic weapons in their assault. The attackers also left several improvised explosive devices that fortunately did not detonate. The terrorists were killed during a five-minute shootout with police four hours after the terror incident began. The perpetrators' demise took place on a street some two miles from the attack site.

In April 2013, the Tsarnaev brothers detonated two pressure cooker bombs near the finish line of the Boston Marathon, killing 3 and injuring over 260 others. One of the brothers, Tamerlan, was purportedly killed when his sibling Dzhokhar drove over him while trying to escape from police. Dzhokhar was ultimately captured, convicted on multiple murder counts and other charges, and sentenced to death.

The Islamic State/ISIS is believed to have inspired the perpetrators in the Orlando and San Bernardino incidents. Various jihadist ideologies seem to have motivated the Boston attackers.

General Findings

Despite some commonalities, each incident posed unique challenges arising from a variety of factors, such as the number of perpetrators in the attack, the weapons used, the number of sites involved, the number of persons killed and wounded, readiness and capabilities of first responders—particularly the medical community—and vagaries such as the time of day of the incident, proximity to hospitals, and types of triage at the attack sites.

Of the terror attacks addressed above, the highest death toll (130) occurred in Paris, when multiple operatives used a variety of modus operandi to inflict damage. The fatalities arising from determined lone wolves in the cases in Nice (86), Oslo (77), and Orlando (49) demonstrate the lethality that can arise from even a single person perpetrating an attack.

Another factor to consider is whether terror incidents are one-off events or part of a larger cycle of attacks spanning multiple hours or days. As in the Boston attacks, secondary explosions may occur within seconds or much longer after a first detonation. An incident may initially comprise an active shooter situation, but improvised explosive devices can be set for detonation after the attackers leave the target area, as witnessed in the San Bernardino barrage. Active shooter situations can transform into hostage situations as in the Orlando attack and the Bataclan theater segment of the Paris incidents.

Prior active shooter drills and emergency preparedness instruction proved to be helpful in responding to high-casualty incidents. Utilizing interdisciplinary training—encompassing medical, law enforcement, emergency management, and fire services— aids in effective responses as participants become aware of what each group is responsible for during a crisis. Moreover, collaborative training—including with the private sector—contributes to forging solid social networks and confidence in partners.

Hospitals may establish an incident command center, often based outside the emergency department. Specially designated trauma centers are well equipped to deal with injuries that occur during mass casualty terror attacks. Other hospitals, too, can serve key roles in treating the wounded when such incidents strike a city.

Once hospitals begin accepting victims of mass casualty attacks, they may raise their security posture. Besides victims and their families, hospitals may contend with an inflow of first responders, the media, and the public.

Serendipity can play a role in such incidents, including having attacks occur close to a hospital, senior staff already present at the hospital during the attack, and recently completed training on mass casualty attacks. The Orlando attack took place about one-third of a mile from the Orlando Regional Medical Center and directly opposite an Orlando fire station.

The success of law enforcement in neutralizing terrorists as quickly as possible facilitates access to the victims. Some incidents allow for access to the injured within minutes. Others may take longer due to a remote location or the extended nature of the attack (e.g., a hostage situation or time in securing the area prior to reaching the victims). Helicopters can aid in bringing those wounded to hospitals more rapidly than other means, particularly when remote sites are involved. Dozens of ambulances may appear at staging areas shortly after an attack. Short transport times to medical facilities raise the chances of survival but do not guarantee it.

After large-scale attacks, cell and other telephone communications may be limited as the systems become overwhelmed. Alternative communication methods should be established beforehand (e.g., radio communications, internal networks, email), as rapid, unfettered dissemination of information is critical in such crises.

Emergency Plans

Cities that anticipated a possible mass casualty terror attack were well prepared to respond to the terror that they experienced. Emergency departments benefit from establishing procedures to respond to mass casualties. Also, backups can contribute to improved responses. In some instances, a triage tent was set up outside of the emergency department. Also, triage areas can be established near the incidents themselves so the wounded can be tended to initially, prior to transport for further care.

Following an incident, a medical facility may declare a code black, meaning only terror patients will be accepted into the hospital. Hospitals must keep the issue of security in mind as well, as the hospital could become a target of an escaping terrorist or designated as a secondary target from the onset.

The seriousness of the Paris attacks resulted in the activation of the Plan Blanc (White Plan), which called upon forty public hospitals in the city to marshal additional staff, cancel nonurgent procedures, and create space for the influx of prospective victims.

In Nice, the White Plan was activated quickly once the severity of the incident was understood. The Health Regional Agency initiated an incident command base that reached out to neighboring hospitals and located available beds.

Emergency exercises, including simulations, aided medical preparedness in Nice. Such programs were undertaken after the November 2015 Paris attacks, and in anticipation of threats arising from the European Football (Soccer) Championships.

Proximity to a Target

The proximity of a hospital to an attack can be critical in getting the injured to medical care rapidly but also may create challenges to access due to spillover effects of attacks (e.g., shooters going to other locations for additional targets as well as securing the perimeter and crime scene). As noted earlier, reaching a hospital quickly does not ensure a patient's survival.

Reaching, Admitting, and Treating the Wounded

Specially trained medics may enter warm zones—areas where an active shooter might be present—with law enforcement (often SWAT personnel) to assess the status of each victim and their chances of survival. In such cases, medics may treat patients prior to the apprehension or neutralization of the perpetrator(s). The risks to such medical personnel should not be underestimated.

At pre-hospital triage, patients may be separated into immediate/delayed emergency status, minor emergencies, and dead or dying. Accordingly, patients are distributed to different hospitals for varied levels of care. Medical facilities face the challenge of treating many severely wounded individuals in multiple waves. The chaos and fluidity of such incidents may complicate the tagging and tracking of patients.

Coupling multiple terror modalities such as gunfire and explosives, as took place in Paris, provides the medical field with the challenges of treating such concomitant wounds. Against that backdrop, one demarcation setting for the wounded included the critically wounded, those needing immediate treatment, and those who could be sent home within a day. Determining which patient to treat first can prove burdensome if a high number of casualties are involved.

Depending on the location targeted, there could be a large variance in the ages of victims, including a relatively high number of children and teenagers killed or injured. In some locations, such as international airports or tourist sites, the victims may include a higher percentage of foreign nationals than otherwise. The foreigners may not be able to communicate well with emergency or medical personnel without foreign language translation. Communication with patients can also be hampered by the fact that some are unconscious, unable to speak, or in shock. Also, noise levels are magnified, making comprehension difficult at times.

Victims will arrive at a hospital after a terror attack having suffered various levels of harm, making the capacity to distinguish among them rapidly of particular necessity. Victims may arrive at a hospital by their own means or be brought by a family member, friend, stranger, or emergency professionals. Terror victims may include multiple family members. The Boston Marathon bombings resulted in the loss of limbs of many family members: Jessica Downes lost both her legs, while the attack robbed her husband, Patrick, of one leg.⁴¹ Also, brothers J.P. and Paul Norden, who watched the race near the finish line, each lost a leg from damage arising from the homemade explosives.⁴²

The Nice attack, which was not a family affiliated terror incident, did result in multiple victims within the same family. Sisters Magdalena and Marzena Chrzanowska, who were on vacation from their native Poland, died in the attack. Likewise, Frenchman Pierre Hattermann, his wife, and their child were killed in the truck onslaught. Michael Pellegrini, his mother Veronique Lion, and his grandparents, Germain and Gisele Lion, also perished in the attack in southern France. Furthermore, American father and son Sean and Brodie Copeland lost their lives in the truck attack.⁴³

The November 2015 ISIS attack in Paris also resulted in the deaths of several victims from the same families. For example, Elsa Deplace San Martin and her mother, Patricia San Martin, were killed in the Bataclan theater while trying to protect Elsa's five-year-old son, Louis, who survived the attack conducted by multiple operatives.⁴⁴ Similarly, cousins Stephane and Pierre Innocenti perished while attending the Bataclan theater that evening.⁴⁵

The growing prevalence of mass casualty attacks has spurred calls for the public to use tourniquets to reduce excessive bleeding prior to first responders' arriving on the scene. Yet others question nonprofessionals' attempting such measures. Depending on the incident, shooting victims may suffer a high proportion of head and chest wounds, rather than injuries to extremities. Mass casualty attacks may necessitate significant demands for blood supplies.

The creation of complete patient lists may take time, making accessibility difficult for concerned family members. In locales where gun violence is uncommon, treating gunshot wounds may prove more arduous than in other cities. Besides the physical injuries that victims sustain, some may also suffer negative psychological effects. Therefore, victim services, including a psychological support center, are crucial in treating such patients.

Staffing

Hospitals directly contacted their physicians, nurses, and other medical personnel, while other personnel learned of the tragedy through social media, family, or friends. In some circumstances, employees were told not to come to the hospital as adequate staffing levels were secured. Alternatively, some workers arrived at their respective hospitals upon hearing about the scope of the terror attack, seeking to contribute even on their days off.

*Combating Terrorism*⁴⁶

There are generic and specific factors that affect the intensity of future terrorist challenges. Generic components that contribute to terrorism include ethnic, racial, religious, and tribal intolerance and violence; propaganda and psychological warfare; extreme nationalism; regional conflicts that defy easy solutions; intensification of criminal activities such as narcotrafficking and identity theft; the population explosion, migration expansion, and unemployment; environmental challenges; weapons development and proliferation of conventional and unconventional arms; and the growth of global mobility and sophisticated communication systems.

Specific factors and conditions that will encourage terrorism in the future include the absence of a universal definition of terrorism, disagreement over the root causes of terrorism, a double standard of morality, loss of resolve by some governments to take effective action against terrorism, weak punishment of terrorists, violations of international law and promotion of terrorism by some nations, the complexity of modern societies, the high costs of security, and disparate viewpoints on appropriate counterterrorism strategies. These contributing variables foreshadow global vulnerability to terrorism. Within the political violence rubric, family terror networks, likewise, are expected to remain a challenge for the foreseeable future.

Weakness and appeasement of terrorists will only invite more terrorism, not less. Terrorism must be combated at all levels of society. Government (civilian and military), the business community, nonprofits, nongovernmental organizations, and the public must adopt best practices in countering violent extremism, including preventing and dissuading individuals from being enticed by the throngs of terrorism—whether family affiliated or otherwise.

Conclusion

This article addressed general principles of terrorism, including definitions, terror threats, types of terror and extremist groups, modes of radicalization and recruitment, predicting susceptibility to radicalism, radicalization and family affiliated terrorism, terrorist characteristics, porous borders, profiling of terrorists, creation of terrorists, female terrorists, terrorists in the economic system, financing terror, the role of corporate security, public-private partnership in combating terrorism, labor and management challenges to terrorism, emergency management/medical responses to mass casualty terror incidents, and combating terrorism. These topics provide the reader with a solid background on terrorism.

Notes

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